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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103, Utah Code
Annotated, and the Order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring this case to this court
for disposition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review by this appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err in granting the defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment as a sanction against the plaintiffs pursuant to Rules 16(d) and 37(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
a.

Standard of Review: The trial court's entry of summary

judgment is reviewed for correctness, according its conclusions of law no deference.
Summary judgment should be granted only where no genuine issues of material fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hall v. NACM
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97,1J9, 988 P.2d 942, 945 - 946. The trial court's
imposition of sanctions under Rules 16 and 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty
West Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, \9, 129 P.3d 287, 289; Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT
App 152,135,71 P.3d 601, 612.
b.

This issue was preserved in the trial court by the plaintiffs'

Motion for Summary Judgment (Record ("Rec") at pp. 506 - 554) and the arguments of

1

counsel at the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment on January 8, 2008.
Rec. at 627.
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sanctioning the plaintiffs

under Rules 16 and 37 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failing to provide an expert
report, where the trial court had already granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, and
where the defendants also failed to provide an expert report as required by the trial court?
a.

Standard of Review: The trial court's imposition of sanctions

under Rules 16 and 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App
48, ^j9, 129 P.3d 287, 289; Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, Tf35, 71 P.3d 601, 612.
b.

This issue was preserved in the trial court by the plaintiffs'

Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. at pp. 506 - 554), and the arguments of counsel at
the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment on January 8, 2008. Rec. at
627.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling
or pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially
unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative,
may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any
of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition
to any other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney
2

representing the party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred
because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless
the court finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an
order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule
or Rule 35, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified,
the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to
the failure as are just, including the following:
(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order;
(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order
is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render
judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney fees, caused by the failure;
(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination, as contempt of court; and
(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
Rule 26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
3

(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court,
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by
the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for
the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court,
the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days
after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if
the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same
subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60
days after the disclosure made by the other party.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below.

This case concerns the plaintiffs' Petition to Void Transfer of Trust Assets and
Award Damages which was filed in an effort to void certain payments made by Bruce
Hughes, as trustee of the plaintiffs' mothers' trust, to companies in which Bruce Hughes
held a pecuniary interest. Plaintiffs are beneficiaries under the trust. By their Petition in
the trial court, the plaintiffs sought to: (a) void a payment of $6,000.00 made to an entity
known as The Academy at Cedar Mountain ("The Academy") and require restitution of
4

such sum to the plaintiffs; (b) void a payment of $115,000.00 made to an entity known as
Academy Equity Investors ("Academy Equity Investors") and require restitution of such
sum to the plaintiffs; (c) require Bruce Hughes to provide an accounting of his actions as
trustee; (d) require Bruce Hughes to make restitution to the plaintiffs of all sums and
assets wrongfully transferred; and (e) award the plaintiffs punitive damages as against
Bruce Hughes. Rec. at pp. 1-7.
On December 1, 2003, the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
("Defendants' First MSJ"). Rec. at pp. 52 - 167. After hearing on March 23, 2004, the
trial court exercised its authority under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
allow more discovery in the case without ruling on the Defendants' First MSJ. Rec. at
625, p. 14.
On June 30, 2006, the defendants again filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
("Defendants' Second MSJ"). Rec. at pp. 250 - 372. The plaintiffs filed a Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' First MSJ") and opposed the defendants' motion.
Rec. at pp. 281 - 315. A hearing was held on the motions on November 14, 2006. A true
and correct copy of the transcript of such hearing is attached hereto as Addendum A.
After the hearing, the trial court, on December 12, 2006, issued its Order on Motions for
Summary Judgment, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B.
In such Order, the trial court denied Defendants' Second MSJ and ruled in favor of
plaintiffs, finding that "Because of the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the
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buy-sell agreements, the payment to The Academy and to Academy Equity investors (sic)
must be disgorged and returned to the trust." See Addendum B at p. 7.
On December 22, 2006, defendants filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of
Fact and/or Judgment. Rec. at pp. 353 - 369. Plaintiffs opposed such motion and a
hearing was held on February 20, 2007. A true and correct copy of the transcript of such
hearing is attached hereto as Addendum C. During such hearing, the trial court denied
the defendants' motion. However, the trial court nevertheless ordered the parties to each
designate an expert witness and exchange expert reports by dates certain. See Addendum
C at p. 20, line 20 - p. 21, line 18. Thereafter, a Stipulated Scheduling Order
("Scheduling Order") was entered on April 26, 2007. Rec. at pp. 390 - 391. Each of the
parties thereafter designated an expert witness but neither of the parties provided any
expert reports by the dates required by the Scheduling Order. Rec. at pp. 513 - 514.
Because the defendants failed to comply with the trial court's order of December
12, 2006, by returning the funds at issue to the trust, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an
Order to Show Cause against the defendants on August 17, 2007. Rec. at pp. 396 - 399,
412 - 423. After the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, the trial court ordered that the
funds be immediately paid to plaintiffs' counsel to be held in trust until further order of
the trial court. Rec. at pp. 500 - 501.
After the plaintiffs sought the Order to Show Cause, but before the matter was
heard, the defendants filed another Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants Third
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MSJ"). Rec. at pp. 431 - 466. The defendants' motion was supported by the affidavit of
defendants' designated expert and sought judgment on the sole basis that the plaintiffs
had not filed an expert report by the deadline set by the Scheduling Order. In response,
plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike the affidavit of defendants' expert based upon the fact
that the defendants had also not provided an expert report by the deadline set by the
Scheduling Order, and filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec. at pp. 502 554. On December 4,2007, the trial court entered its order striking the affidavit of
defendants' designated expert. Rec. at pp. 585 - 586. The trial court heard argument on
the parties' motions for summary judgment on January 8, 2008. A true and correct copy
of the transcript of such hearing is attached hereto as Addendum D. After hearing the
parties' arguments, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision on Motions for
Summary Judgment on February 4, 2008. A true and correct copy of the memorandum
decision is attached hereto as Addendum E. By its memorandum decision, the trial court
granted Defendants' Third MSJ and dismissed the plaintiffs' case based solely upon the
plaintiffs' failure to provide an expert report by the date set by the Scheduling Order. See
Addendum E. This appeal followed.
II

Statement of Relevant Facts.

The best statement of relevant facts from which to initially understand this case
comes from the trial court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment entered December
12, 2006. See Addendum B. The facts, as set forth therein, are as follows:
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1.

Plaintiffs are the adult children of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr and beneficiaries

of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust ("the trust"), dated December 5, 2000. Sheryl
Farr died on October 18, 2001.
2.

Defendant Bruce Hughes was named as the successor trustee of the trust

and acted as such upon Sheryl Farr's death.
3.

The trust document provides for payment of legal claims in these terms:
6.1. Payment of Expenses, Claims, and Taxes. On my death, my Trustee is
authorized, but not directed, to pay the following:

6.1.2. Legal Claims. Legally enforceable claims against me or my
estate.
4.

Further, under section 12.4 of trust, the trustee is required to report to the

beneficiaries "at least semiannually ... all of the receipts, disbursements, and distributions
occurring during the reporting period, along with a complete statement of the trust
property."
5.

Defendant The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. ("The Academy"), is a

Utah corporation doing business in Iron County. The Academy operated a private school
in Cedar City. Prior to the death of Sheryl Farr, the shareholders of The Academy, each
holding equal shares, were Sheryl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller,
and Jody Turtle.

8

6.

Defendant Academy Equity Investors, LLC ("Academy Equity Investors"'),

was a Utah limited liability company; however, the company expired in 2005 for failure
to renew. Academy Equity Investors was organized in order to receive contributions to
finance the school as a whole. Prior to the death of Sheryl Fair, the shareholders of
Academy Equity Investors, each holding equal shares, were also Sheryl Fan*, Bruce
Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Turtle.
7.

Academy Acres, LLC ("Academy Acres") is a Utah limited liability

company. Academy Acres owned the real estate on which The Academy operated. Prior
to the death of Sheryl Farr, the members of Academy Acres were the same five
individuals - Sheryl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Turtle
- and each held an equal interest.
8.

Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, and Thomas Fuller were the directors of

The Academy.
9.

Exhibit A to The Academy's bylaws, adopted by the directors on January 4,

2000, is a shareholder buy-sell agreement with the following provisions [set forth below
in the agreement's own, somewhat Victorian, style of capitalization]:
1.3 Transfers at Death. On the death of any Stockholder, the Stockholder's
Personal Representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to The
Academy all the deceased Stockholder's shares in the Company at the
Agreement Price and on the Agreement Terms, as indicated in this section.
1.3.1. The Academy shall have sixty (60) days from the date of the
death of the deceased Stockholder in which to elect to buy all of the
Offered Shares....
9

1.7 Ownership in Academy Acres, LLC. The Shareholders contemplate the
formation of a real estate Limited Liability Company to be named Academy
Acres, LLC, for the purpose of owning and operating real estate and real
property for the use and lease by The Academy. Any transfer deemed to
have occurred under this Section shall automatically trigger a Buyout of the
Stockholder's ownership in Academy Acres LLC...

2.1. Annual Revisions. Each year the Stockholders shall meet and shall
review the Agreement Price. If the Stockholders unanimously so agree, they
shall modify the Agreement Price to reflect what they believe to be the then
current fair market value of the Company minus all mortgages, debts,
Stockholder loans and accrued payables of the Company. It is possible,
from time to time, that the Agreement Price will be a negative value, which
will represent an obligation of the transferring Stockholder or their [sic]
estate to the company....
2.2. Automatic Adjustment. At the end of each fiscal year beginning after
the date of this Agreement, if the Stockholders have not unanimously
agreed to an adjustment in the Agreement Price for two consecutive fiscal
years, pursuant to Section 2.1., the Agreement Price, as most recently
adjusted, shall be valued by appraisal pursuant to Section 2.3.
2.3. How Computed. The Agreement Price will be the fair market value of
Offered Shares as determined by the independent certified public
accountant ("CPA") regularly employed by The Academy or, if The
Academy has no regularly employed independent CPA, an independent
CPA selected by The Academy for this purpose. This valuation shall be
determined under the same methods as would be used for determining the
estate tax value of the Offered Shares if the Offering Stockholder had died
on the date the offer was deemed made, ignoring any alternate valuation
date (under Code Section 2032) or special use valuation (under Code
Section 2032A)....
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3.2. Negative Value Payment Due to The Academy. If the Agreed Value
calculated or agreed to in Section 2 above, is a Negative Value, the
terminating Stockholder or their [sic] estate will have an obligation payable
to the Company.
3.2.1. Due to the Death of a Stockholder. The Negative Value of the
Scares of a deceased Stockholder shall, to the extent of the death benefit
ainount of the life insurance policies that any Stockholder has maintained
urider Section 4, be paid in cash or by good personal check. Any remaining
amount of the Negative Value shall be a claim against the available assets
of the Stockholder's estate.
10.

The initial members of Academy Acres also entered into an operating

agreement which was effective as of August 1, 2000. This operating agreement contained
a buy-sell agreement as its Exhibit A. Sections 1.3, 1.3.1, 2.3, 3.2, and 3.2.1 of the
Academy Acre's buy-sell agreement correspond nearly exactly with sections 1.3, 1.3.1,
2.3, 3.2. and 3.2-1., respectively, of The Academy's buy-sell agreement; however,
Academy Acres' agreement substitutes "member" for "stockholder" and "interest" for
"shares."
11.

Stockholder/member Thomas Fuller regularly provided and maintained the

accounting books and records of The Academy and Academy Acres. Another
stockholder/member, Thomas Hughes, is an accountant, and regularly performed and
maintained accounting books and records for The Academy, Academy Acres, and
Academy Equity Investors.
12.

Neither Thomas Fuller nor Thomas Hughes is "an independent CPA."
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13.

Upon the death of Sheryl Farr, Thomas Fuller calculated her share of the

negative value of The Academy and Academy Acres.
14.

In addition, Thomas Hughes prepared an accounting of The Academy's and

Academy Acres' assets and liabilities. He states in his affidavit that he made a valuation
"by the same methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered
shares if the offering shareholder had died on the date the offer was deemed made,
ignoring any alternate valuation date ... or special use valuation," as required by the buysell agreements.
15.

According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, The Academy's liabilities

exceeded its assets by $572,716.70 and Academy Acres' liabilities exceeded its assets by
$177,861.62. He determined that the amount of the debt chargeable to the estate of
Sheryl Farr was $113,543.34 for The Academy and $35,572.32 for Academy Acres, a
total of $149,115.66.
16.

Defendant Bruce Hughes transferred $6,000,00 from trust funds directly to

The Academy in partial payment of Sheryl Fair's negative value in that entity. He also
paid $115,000.00 of the trust's funds to Academy Equity Investors as partial payment of
the decedent's negative value in The Academy and Academy Acros.
17.

Bruce Hughes did not provide an accounting of his actions as trustee to the

beneficiaries of the trust.
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18.

No annual revisions were made to the agreement price as required by

sections 2.1 of the respective buy-sell agreements; neither was any valuation of the
agreement price made by appraisal as required by sections 2.2 of the respective buy-sell
agreements.
19.

It is not clear whether The Academy elected to purchase the Sheryl Farr's

shares or interest within the 60-day provision of the buy-sell agreements at 1.3.1.
20.

At the time he executed the checks to The Academy and to Academy Equity

Investors, Bruce Hughes held a pecuniary, ownership, and substantial beneficial interest
in those companies and thus personally benefitted from such payment.
See Addendum B at pp. 1 - 6
21.

At the hearing on the Defendants' Second MSJ and the Plaintiffs' First

MSJ, the trial court noted: "Okay. Well, counsel, I do agree with you there is no use
trying this case. Would not do us any good at all to try this matter as it stands now,
because this can't be resurrected. The failure to do the regular valuations and the failure
to have the regular reports, we can't go back and make that happen. It would be a
meaningless act.. . . But tell your clients not to get ready to save up a bunch of money for
trial either because I don't think a trial is going to do us any good. I think we have the
record we need." See Addendum A at p. 25, lines 10-25.
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Based upon the foregoing facts as found by the trial court, and the arguments
presented at the hearing on the matter, the trial court entered the following conclusions of
law in its December 12, 2006 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment.
22.

"Defendant Bruce Hughes, as trustee, was therefore charged as a fiduciary

with a strict duty of loyalty in his dealings with the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the trust."
See Addendum B at p. 6.
23.

"Here it is undisputed that Bruce Hughes had a personal interest in those

entities paid with trust funds." Id.
24.

"While the terms of the trust permitted him to use trust funds to pay 'legally

enforceable claims,5 it does not authorize the trustee to pay those claims unless and until
they are legally enforceable. Neither does it authorize him to pay an amount which may
be greater than what is legally enforceable." Id. at pp. 6 - 7.
25.

"The buy-sell agreements do not give rise to an enforceable claim against

the deceased member's or shareholder's estate until certain conditions are fulfilled. . . .
The agreement price is defined as 'fair market value as determined by the independent
certified public accountant.' (2.3) Thomas Fuller and Thomas Hughes are not certified
public accountants, nor are they even arguably independent." Id. at p. 7.
26.

"Accordingly, the Court holds the buy-sell agreements were breached when

trust funds were paid without a determination by an independent CPA." Id.
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27.

"Further, the failure to apprise the beneficiaries of the trust debts, to provide

semiannual accountings, and to obtain any independent review of the amount of the debt
properly chargeable against Ms. Farr's estate represents a breach of the trustee's duties of
loyalty and 'utmost fidelity.'" Id.
28.

Based upon the above facts and legal conclusions, the trial court ordered:
"1. Because of the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and the breach of the

buy-sell agreements, the payment to The Academy and to Academy Equity Investors must
be disgorged and returned to the trust.
2. The buy-sell agreements must be followed.
3. It remains for the parties to either litigate their obligations under the buysell agreements, or settle or mediate." Id. at pp. 7 - 8.
Additional material facts to this case are as follows:
29.

No claim was ever asserted against the plaintiffs in the trial court by The

Academy or Academy Equity Investors. Rec. at pp. 17 - 22, 39 - 44.
30.

Academy Acres is not, and never has been, a party to this case. Rec. at pp.

1-7, 17-22,39-44.
31.

On December 22, 2006, defendants filed a Motion to Alter or Amend

Findings of Fact and/or Judgment. Rec. at pp. 353 - 369. During the hearing on such
motion, the trial court, while denying the defendants' motion, nevertheless directed the
parties to each designate an expert witness and exchange expert reports by dates certain to
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ascertain whether the amounts claimed by the defendants were correctly calculated. See
Addendum C at p. 20, line 20 - p. 21, line 18.
32.

Despite the fact that both the plaintiffs and defendants had designated

expert witnesses but not produced expert reports, the trial court, on February 4, 2008,
issued its Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment and granted
Defendants' Third MS J and dismissed the plaintiffs' case solely for plaintiffs5 failure to
provide an expert report. See Addendum E.
34.

No sanction was imposed against the defendants for failing to abide by the

Scheduling Order by providing an expert report. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Based upon the fact that the trial court had rendered summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and refused to alter or amend such judgment or its findings in relation
thereto, the defendants were effectively precluded from raising any claim against the
plaintiffs. This is due to the trial court's finding that the defendant companies had
breached the buy-sell agreements and that the trustee had breached his fiduciary duties to
the beneficiaries of the trust in both managing the trust and making the payments at issue
in this case. These trial court findings, conclusions and judgment are the law of the case.
Where a party breaches a contract, the nonbreaching party is excused from
performance. Since the defendant companies breached the buy-sell agreements, Ms.
Farr's estate was relieved from performance and thus the transfers made by the trustee
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were not on account of legally enforceable claims as required by the trust. No expert
testimony regarding amounts claimed due by the defendant companies could affect the
trial court's findings and judgment in this regard. The same is true as to the trial court's
findings, conclusions and judgment determining that the trustee had breached his
fiduciary duties.
If the production of an expert report by the plaintiffs could be deemed necessary
after the court's rendering of summary judgment, such report would not be required for
any purpose other than rebuttal, since the trial court had already invalidated the
defendants' accounting and entered judgment for plaintiffs. Therefore, based upon all of
the above, the plaintiff was substantially justified in not providing an expert report.
Because the trial court's ruling issuing sanctions against the plaintiffs fails to
explain how the plaintiffs failure to provide an expert report affected the court or the
defendants, the trial court's ruling is insufficient. This is also true based upon the fact
that the trial court's ruling states that the plaintiffs were not substantially justified in not
providing the report, but fails to set forth any basis for such statement. In fact, based
upon the prior findings, conclusions and summary judgment, the plaintiffs wrere
substantially justified in not providing an expert report until, if at all, after receipt of the
defendants' expert report. However, the defendants never provided an expert report
either, although ordered to do so. Despite this fact, the trial court sanctioned the plaintiffs
for not providing a report but rewarded the defendants even though they were as much at
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fault as the plaintiffs for not providing an expert report. Such unequal treatment of the
parties is an abuse of discretion and unjust.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law.

The trial court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, according
its conclusions of law no deference. Summary judgment should be granted only where no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Hall v. NACM Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, \9, 988 P.2d 942, 945 946. The trial court's imposition of sanctions under Rules 16 and 37, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services,
Inc. v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, | 9 , 129 P.3d 287, 289; Depew v.
Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, |35, 71 P.3d 601, 612. In this case, summary judgment was
entered as a sanction against the plaintiffs and not because the trial court found that there
were no disputed issues of material fact or that the defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Therefore, the abuse of discretion standard is most applicable to this
case.
In imposing sanctions under Rule 37, the trial court must make sufficient findings
to support the imposition of sanctions and such findings must allow the appellate court to
determine from a reading of the record "upon what legal ground the sanctions are
imposed" and such findings must also "explain how the [actions of the party sanctioned]
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affected either the court or [the other parties to the action]." Hall v. NACM
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, f22, 988 P.2d 942, 948.
In Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah App 1997), this court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim based upon the
defendant's failure to obtain an expert witness within the time required by the trial court.
The trial court had entered an order granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
unless the defendant obtained an expert to testify as to the attorney standard of care and
alleged breach of that standard and who would be ready to be deposed within sixty days.
This court noted: "Because dismissal of a party's action for failure to respond to a court
order compelling discovery is a harsh sanction, 'the court must find on the part of the
noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or "persistent dilatory tactics
frustrating the judicial process.'" Id. at 263. This court found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions due to the defendant's repeated dilatory actions.
The requirement to find willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics
tending to frustrate the judicial process has also been noted in Aurora Credit Services,
Inc. v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, Tf9, 129 P.3d 287, 291, Coxey v.
Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Aerie No. 2742, 2005 UT App 185, \A, 112 P.3d 1244,
1246, Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, |16, 999 P.2d 588, 592, and Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). "To support a finding of
willfulness, there need only be any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary
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noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v.
Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, f9, 129 P.3d 287, 291, Coxey v. Fraternal
Order of the Eagles, Aerie No. 2742, 2005 UT App 185, TJ6, 112 P.3d 1244, 1246. "The
sanction of default judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the judicial
process, viz., where the failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the merits and
makes it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer have any factual
merit.55 W.W.&W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah
1977).
However, notwithstanding the discretion granted to a trial court in determining the
imposition of sanctions: "The extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered
by the careful exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited.55 Id.
In Carman v. Slovens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976), the trial court had stricken a
defendant's answer and entered his default based upon the defendant's failure to appear at
his deposition or produce documents at such deposition. In reversing the trial court's
sanction, the Utah Supreme Court noted
It is true that where the authority to perform a proposed action rests within
the discretion of the court we must allow considerable latitude in which he
may exercise his judgment. But this does not mean that the court has
unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary manner. Fundamental to the
concept of the rule of law is the principle that reason and justice shall
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person; and that
applies to all men in every status: to courts and judges, as well as autocrats
and bureaucrats. The meaning of the term "discretion" itself imports that
the action should be taken within reason and good conscience in the interest
of protecting the rights of both parties and serving the ends of justice. It has
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always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy.
Id. at 603 (footnotes omitted).
II.

The Procedural Setting of this Case in the Trial Court at the Time the
Court Entered Sanctions Against the Plaintiffs is Essential to a
Determination of Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion.

The determination by this court of the question of whether the trial court abused its
discretion in sanctioning the plaintiffs as it did requires a review of all of the pertinent
procedural aspects of this case. In that regard., the circumstances existing at the time the
sanctions were entered by the trial court include: (a) the trial court had entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law that: (i) the buy-sell agreements had been breached by the
defendants; and (ii) the trustee had violated his duties of loyalty and utmost fidelity by
failing to apprise the beneficiaries of the trust debts, failing to provide semiannual
accountings, and failing to obtain any independent review of the amount of the debt
properly chargeable against Ms. Farr's estate; (b) the trial court had granted the plaintiffs
summary judgment under the Plaintiffs' First MS J and ordered that, based upon the
trustee's breach of fiduciary duties and the breach of the buy-sell agreements, the
payments to the Academy and Academy Equity Investors had to be returned to the trust;
and (c) the trial court had advised the parties that there was no use trying the case because
the defendants' breach of the buy-sell agreements by failing to properly calculate the
agreement price for Ms. Fair's interests in the companies "could not be resurrected" and
with "the failure to do the regular valuations and the failure to have the regular reports,
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we can't go back and make that happen. It would be a meaningless act." See Addendum
A at p. 25, lines 10 - 16. Additionally, although claims were made by the defendants that
Academy Acres was owed money, Academy Acres has never been a party to this action,
Academy Equity Investors was a defunct company and not registered with the State of
Utah and no counterclaim or other claim had ever been asserted in this action by either of
the business entities named as defendants.
III.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Granting Summary Judgment
to the Defendants and Dismissing the Plaintiffs' Case.

Under all of the circumstances of this case, the trial court's order imposing
sanctions against the plaintiffs, granting the defendants summary judgment and
dismissing the plaintiffs' case, was an abuse of discretion since (a) the case had already
been decided in favor of the plaintiffs; (b) the expert reports at issue were neither required
under the rules nor needed for plaintiffs to further prosecute this case; (c) the trial court
failed to enter findings as to why the plaintiffs' failure to provide the reports was not
substantially justified or what effect such failure had on the court or the other parties; (d)
the plaintiffs' failure to provide such reports was substantially justified; and (e) the
defendants also failed to adhere to the trial court's order to provide expert reports.
A.

The plaintiffs were awarded summary judgment on all material
claims and such judgment precluded all recovery by the
defendants notwithstanding any expert reports or testimony.

The petition filed by the plaintiffs in this case included one cause of action against
the defendant companies to void the payments of $6,000.00 and $115,000.00 made by the
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trustee and to have such sums restored to the trust beneficiaries. All other claims were
against Bruce Hughes in his capacity as trustee and sought to void the transfers of funds,
require an accounting by the trustee, require the trustee to make restitution of all sums and
assets wrongfully transferred, and award the plaintiffs punitive damages as against the
trustee. Rec. at pp. 1-7. By its December 12, 2006 Order on Motions for Summary
Judgment, the trial court found that the defendant companies had breached the buy-sell
agreements and that the trustee had breached his fiduciary duties. Each of these findings
provides an independent basis for restoring the transferred funds to the trust beneficiaries.
The trial court's findings, conclusions and order of summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs under the December 12, 2006 Order constitute law of the case. "Simply
stated, under the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an issue during one stage
of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.'55 IHC Health Services,
Inc. v.D& KManagement, Inc., 2008 UT 36, ^26, 606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (footnote
omitted). While the trial court retained the option of revisiting the decided issues prior to
final judgment or appeal, the trial court failed to do so. In fact, in denying the defendants5
Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and/or Judgment, the trial court specifically
refused to do so. Based thereon, the December 12, 2006 findings, conclusions and
summary judgment constitute law of the case.
Because of the December 12, 2006 Order, the defendant companies were wholly
precluded from claiming that they had any right to retain the funds at issue or that the
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estate owed such companies any amount, regardless of what expert testimony might show
as to the agreement price for the interests of Ms. Fan. "The law is well settled that a
material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by the
nonbreaching party (citations omitted). Also, a party seeking to enforce a contract must
prove performance of its own obligations under the contract." Holbrook v. Master
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). Since the trial court ruled that the
defendant companies had breached the buy-sell agreements, the companies had no claim
against Ms. Farr's estate and could not claim a right to keep the funds which had been
transferred to such companies by the trustee. The breach by the companies could not be
cured since under the buy-sell agreements, upon the death of a member/shareholder, the
companies had only sixty (60) days from the date of the death of the deceased
member/shareholder in which to elect to buy the offered interest. Thus, for the companies
to comply with the terms of the buy-sell agreements in attempting to purchase Ms. Farr's
interest, the companies had to fulfill their obligations under the buy-sell agreements
within sixty days of Ms. Farr's death. This did not happen.
Additionally, since the trial court had found that the trustee had breached his
fiduciary duties, the trial court ruled that the trust was entitled to reimbursement of the
funds previously transferred by the trustee. Any expert testimony provided regarding
whether amounts claimed due by the defendant companies were or were not calculated
correctly would in no way cure the trustee's "failure to apprise the beneficiaries of the
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trust debts,. . provide semiannual accountings, [or] obtain any independent review of the
amount of the debt properly chargeable against Ms. Farr's estate." Addendum B at p. 7.
Thus, in light of the trial court's December 12, 2006 Order, expert testimony was
unnecessary and the failure to provide expert reports had no effect upon the court or the
claims of the defendants.
B.

Any expert report on behalf of the plaintiffs was not required to
be provided, if at all, until after the defendants provided their
report.

The Scheduling Order relating to experts, which the trial court relied upon in
sanctioning the plaintiffs, specifically states: "Plaintiffs shall provide to defendants the
required expert report no later than June 15, 2007." Rec. at pp 390 - 391. Under Rule
26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reports are required to be provided for any
expert who may be used at trial to present evidence. However, where the expert is only to
be used to contradict or rebut the other party's expert, such report need not be made until
after receipt of the other party's expert report. Since the plaintiffs had already received a
ruling in their favor requiring restitution of the funds, the only thing they would need to
be prepared to do at trial, if anything, is rebut any expert testimony trying to establish that
the calculation of the agreement price for Ms. Farr's interests in the companies was
properly calculated under the buy-sell agreements. Thus, no expert report could be
prepared, and plaintiffs would have no obligation to do so, until after receipt of the
defendants' report.
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C.

The trial court's findings are insufficient and do not support the
entry of sanctions against the plaintiffs.

As set forth in Hall v. NACMInterrnountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, 988 P.2d 942,
when the trial court imposes sanctions under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
trial court must make sufficient findings to support the imposition of sanctions and such
findings must be sufficient to allow the appellate court to determine from a reading of the
record "upon what legal ground the sanctions are imposed" and such findings must also
"explain how the [actions of the party sanctioned] affected either the court or [the other
parties to the action]." Id. at ^22. The trial court's memorandum decision imposing the
sanctions does clearly indicate that the sanctions are being imposed pursuant to Rules
16(d) and 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the court simply makes the
statement, without elaboration, that "The Court does not find that the failure to adhere to
the established deadlines was substantially justified" and nowhere does the trial court
explain how the plaintiffs5 failure to provide the expert reports affected the court or the
defendants. See Addendum E. In light of the summary judgment previously granted in
favor of the plaintiffs, as explained above, there could be no detrimental affect on the
court or the defendants resulting from the plaintiffs' failure to provide an expert report.
D.

The plaintiffs9 failure to provide an expert report was
substantially justified.

Under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: "If a party . . . fails to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order,... the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make
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such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided
in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D)." Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) . . . unless the court finds that
the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take
such action in regard to the failure as are just."
All of the reasons set forth under the preceding arguments establish a justification
for the plaintiffs not providing an expert report. Expert testimony regarding what the
assets and liabilities of the companies were on the date of Ms. Farr's death or whether the
assets and liabilities of the companies had been previously calculated in accordance with
the buy-sell agreements would make no difference. The fact that the assets and liabilities
had not been calculated according to the buy-sell agreements in the first place was the
issue before the trial court and the trial court resolved that issue in favor of the plaintiffs.
No recalculation of the assets or liabilities, nor any opinion of whether the numbers in the
previous calculation were correct, would save the defendant companies from their breach
of the buy-sell agreements or the trustee from his breach of fiduciary duties. The
plaintiffs were substantially justified in relying on the trial court's December 12, 2006
Order and the judgment granted therein, in determining that they would need to provide
an expert report only for rebuttal purposes after they received the defendants' expert
report, if at all.
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E.

The trial court erred when it sanctioned the plaintiffs for not
providing an expert report and granted the defendants summary
judgment while dismissing the plaintiffs' case, when the
defendants were equally in default of the trial court's order that
the parties provide expert reports.

The Scheduling Order which required expert reports to be provided states:
1.

Plaintiffs shall designate an expert witness by April 30, 2007.

2.

Defendants shall designate an expert witness, if any, by May 15,
2007.

3.

Plaintiffs shall provide to defendants the required expert report no
later than June 15, 2007.

4.

Defendants shall provide to plaintiffs the required expert report no
later than July 13, 2007.

Both the plaintiffs and defendants designated an expert witness. The language requiring
the parties to provide expert reports is identical as to both plaintiffs and defendants. While
the plaintiffs did not provide an expert report, neither did the defendants. Therefore,
defendants were equally in default of the Scheduling Order requirements. Yet the trial
court rewarded rather than sanctioned defendants. Both Rules 16 and 37 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure allow the court to enter sanctions "as are just." Under the
circumstances of this case, and especially considering the defendants' own failure to
provide an expert report as ordered by the court, the action of the trial court in sanctioning
the plaintiff while rewarding the defendant for the same failure is an abuse of discretion
and certainly is unjust.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiffs respectfully request that this court reverse
the trial court's imposition of sanctions, reverse the trial court's grant of the Defendants'
Third MS J, and reverse the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case. Further, based
upon the trial court's December 12, 2006 Order granting plaintiff summary judgment, the
plaintiffs request that this court direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants in the sum of $121,000.00, with interest thereon at
the rate and for the period to be determined by the trial court after hearing, and direct the
trial court to consider and rule upon the issue of awarding attorney fees to the plaintiffs as
part of the judgment to be entered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of September, 2008.

GatyOfKuhlma
AtJ*5>rney for Plaintiffs and Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on September 19, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed First Class mail, postage prepaid to Brian L. Olson, counsel for
Defendants and Appellees, at 965 East 700 South, Suite 305J8t George Utah 84790.
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PROCEEDINGS

3

THE COURT:

Let me go, then, to the matter that we

4

are going to spend some time on.

5

summary judgment in Farr vs. Hughes and Academy at Cedar

6 J Mountain, et al.

And that's a motion for

Mr. Kuhlmann is here on behalf of

plaintiffs, Mr. Olson on behalf of the defendants.
Counsel, we have cross-motions for summary judgment
based upon, basically, the affidavits, the depositions and
10

the documents in the file.

And I do appreciate your courtesy

11

copies, because I spent some quality time during last night's

12

late hours looking at those.

13

out of an accounting concern with the death of Mrs. Farr and

14

the contributions to these defendant entities from her estate

15

based upon the articles and the stock purchase agreements

16

that were organic to the formation of these entities.

17

got correct, Mr. Olson?

As I see it, the dispute arises

Have I

18

MR. OLSON:

That's correct, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

And the dispute from Chad, Alec and Seth

20

Farr, who are heirs of Mrs. Farr, is that her estate's been

21

raided pursuant to the stock purchase agreements.

22

trust, corpus of the trust that she would have otherwise have

23

had for the benefit of Chad, Alec and Seth has been depleted.

24

And that's really what your position as plaintiffs is.

25

I got that right, counsel?

And the

Have

1

MR. KUHLMANN: Correct, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

Gentlemen, much as I hate to say it, I

3

can see this case being a nightmare to try because of the

4

accounting issues in it.

But, Mr. Olson, my foremost concern

5 I is the fact that the documents that we are dealing with
6

require the, and I will put it in quotes because everybody

7

did this in your pleadings, "independent CPAM have

8

fingerprints on these evaluations -- not evaluations, but

9

valuations.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

And while Mr. Hughes —

and its Bruce Hughes who

is the accountant; is that right, counsel?
MR. KUHLMANN: Actually, Bruce Hughes, Tom Hughes and
Tom are all accountats.
THE COURT:
accountants.

Tom Fuller.

Okay.

They are all

But none of them are CPAs; is that correct?

MR. KUHLMANN: I think Bruce Hughes —
have to double check.
THE COURT:

well, I would

I don't recall.

And because of their interests in the

18

corporate entities, the business entities, I!ll put it,

19

because of their interests, how can I make them independent?

20

Is there any way that I can look at this language and find

21

independent there when they seem to have at least, as Mr.

22

Kuhlmannfs clients see, a vested interest in the preservation

23

of the assets of these two entities?

24
25

MR. OLSON:

Sure.

I think I can address that in a

couple of fashions, Your Honor.

First of all, and for what

4

1

it's worth to the court, my first year out of law school

2

experience was with Dwight & Tusch [phonetic].

3

accounting background.

4

right out of law school.

5

the terms they use.

6

accountant" is a phrase used in the accounting world in which

7J

often "independent" doesn't really mean independent.

I have an

I went to work in public accounting
I have a feel for accountants and

The term "independent certified public

The

reality is that certified public accountants mainly came into
9 I

existence for auditing books of large corporations that are

10

publicly traded.

11

books and reports by a certified independent public

12

accountant.

13
14

They have to have the signature on their

THE COURT:

Well, the theory, really, is going back

to the idea that there is objective oversight.

15

MR.

OLSON:

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

17

MR. OLSON:

And the reality is that that company's

Right.

18

accountant is much their guy as their lawyer i s .

It's also

19

the same firm that's giving them tax advice.

20

same firm that's giving them management advice.

21

"independent," at least, my clients are going to see it as

22

accountants are, is not an in-house guy.

13

that's worth, the using the Fuller firm at the time provided

?4

accounting services.

15 \

for these entities.

It's also the
The term

Now, for whatever

They did all of the accounting services
I believe the records show actually

1

billed for their accounting services for these entities.

2

I think that the easier way to deal with this problem -- and

3

I understand where the court's coming from, that, hey, we are

4

supposed to have an accounting by an independent CPA.

5

easier way to deal with this is the accounting that's been

6

provided is an undisputed fact.

7

Hughes', Tom Hughes who did the accounting that was

there.

An

Depositions were taken.

presented, his deposition was taken.

But

Mr.

The accounting was

I placed this accounting in my statement of

undisputed facts.
is inaccurate.

There is no testimony that that accounting

In fact, the testimony of Chad Farr is he

doesn't have any reason to believe the accounting is
inaccurate.

So, as it stands right now, it's an undisputed

fact.
The opposing summary judgment has not disputed the
accounting.

So, regardless of whether the documents called

for independent certified public accountant, regardless of
whether it was Tom Hughes that did that accounting -THE COURT:

You take the position that nobody's found

anything wrong with it.

And if nobody's found anything wrong

with it, taking it down the street to Rod Savage, my
accountant, not going to make a difference in what the facts
are in terms of the accounting?
MR. OLSON:

Not only is it not going to make a

difference, but let's say we don't do summary judgment today

6

1

and we take this case to t r i a l , our discovery d e a d l i n e s are

2

long since p a s t .

3

to come on and testify that these are the right f i g u r e s .

4

They are established.

5

own expert to go in and look at these f i g u r e s .

6

established.

7

CPA at this juncture would look at it and say o t h e r w i s e , they

8

are an undisputed fact.

9

for summary judgment and in the statement of u n d i s p u t e d

There is no other a c c o u n t a n t t h a t ' s going

The p l a i n t i f f s have not h i r e d their

They are undisputed.

T h e y are

You k n o w , w h e t h e r another

In fact, if you look at m y m o t i o n

10

facts, the only fact that's been disputed w a s w h e t h e r one of

11

the entities is a Utah LLC or n o t .
THE COURT:

And that's just b e c a u s e it e x p i r e d in

14

MR.

Right.

15

THE COURT:

Which is p r i o r to these e v e n t s t a k i n g

MR. OLSON:

And it's immaterial to t h i s m o t i o n .

12
13

16

2005.
OLSON:

place.

17

So,

18

all of those facts are established because t h e y h a v e not been

19

controverted.

20 1

purposes of this p r o c e e d i n g .

So, the accounting is e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t for

THE COURT:

21

All right.

And if the a c c o u n t i n g is an

12 1

established fact, the a g r e e m e n t s , the court can r u l e upon as

13 \

a matter of law, and that's really what your m o t i o n

>4

is?

>5

MR. OLSON:

Exactly, Your Honor.

And,

thrust

essentially,

the basis of this lawsuit is going back to try a section of
the probate code that talks about trustees' self-dealing.
And the former 75-7-404 which, essentially, says that a
trustee has to have permission from the court, express in the
trust, or permission of the beneficiaries to deal in any
transaction which he has a conflict of interest.
THE COURT: Your argument is that your authority is
expressed in the trust, and that that provision went by the
9

by in 2004 anyway.

And you don't think the statute that

10

changed that provision had anything to do with the

11

substantive rights of these plaintiffs?
MR. OLSON:

12

Well, and I think we can argue this

13

regardless of statute change.

You know, frankly, I think Mr.

14

Kuhlmann did a good job of arguing the opposite of that --

15

the former statute probably applies.

16

says that there is an exclusion for transactions that are

17

expressly authorized by the trust.

18

undisputed fact that a debt of the estate was created by

19

these buy/sell agreements.

20

the (inaudible) trust said pay the legitimate debts of my

21

estate.

22

legitimate debts of the estate.

23

assuming that the statute, as it applied back then applies

24

right now.

25

(Inaudible) applies.

But the former statute

What we have here is an

We have an undisputed fact that

We have undisputed fact that those were in fact
So, the exclusion applies,

And I think it's a fair argument that it does.

THE COURT:

1

In order to apply the statute, I have to

2

look at the buy/sell agreements as well as the estate

3

documents.

4

a trust, not an estate?

And, counsel, clarify my memory, because this is

5

MR. OLSON:

That is correct, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

But the residue of Mrs. Farr's

7

property was handled within the trust document.

8

look at the trust document together with the buy/sell

9

agreements, the trust document provided that the buy/sell

10

agreements be satisfied.

11

property.

Those are legitimate bills of her

And that's what happened.

MR. OLSON:

12

So, if I

Yes.

Essentially, the buy/sell documents

13

create this debt as a debt of the estate.

14

that before she died.

15

legitimate debts of my estate.

16

combined, we have a legitimate debt of the estate.

17

have a trust that says pay it.
THE COURT:

18
19

That she agreed to

The trust documents says pay the
So, those two documents
And we

And the estate is still in the red

because those debts have not been satisfied.

20

MR. OLSON:

Correct.

21

THE COURT:

By about what?

23

MR. OLSON:

I don't have the figure, but it seems

24

like it's in that ballpark.

25

THE COURT:

22

$35,000 or something like

that?

All right.

I think I've got your

1

argument pretty well in mind.

2

benefits of me getting the courtesy copies ahead of time,

3

because I carry them around with me and get my fingerprints

4

all over them.

5
6

Again, it's one of the great

Mr. Kuhlmann, from your standpoint, you think this
language is way to broad in terms of the authority to pay the

7 J legal obligations of the estate, or the trust, and that this
is a self-dealing situation, and that these entities, Tom and
9 I

Bruce Hughes are too close to it for the court to grant

10

summary judgment.

11

judgment.

12

Mr. Kuhlmann?

But let's look at your side of the summary

Your motion for summary judgment takes me where,
I want to make sure I'm focused on that.

MR. KUHLMANN: Your Honor, there is one basic fact

13
14

here that I think is being hidden.

15

pretty good job of it.

And they have done a

But there are three companies here.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. KUHLMANN: Not two.

Um-hmm.

18

Acres.

19

Academy at Cedar Mountain.

20

a buy/sell agreement.

Three.

One is Academy

And Academy Acres had a buy/sell agreement.

One is a

And Academy at Cedar Mountain had

21

THE COURT: Academy Equity did not.

22

MR. KUHLMANN: Academy Equity Investors did not have.

23

It's an entity, a (inaudible) .Legal entity.

And Bruce Hughes

24

testified (inaudible) involved in too many corporations to

25

think about.

But Academy Equity Investors had no buy/sell

1

agreement.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. KUHLMANN: Academy Equity Investors took 100

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. KUHLMANN: Yeah.

6

How much money did it get?
—

The lion's share then?
It took $112,000.

The payment

went to Academy Equity Investors who was not owed one dime by

7 J Cheryl Farr, nor her trust, nor her estate.
THE COURT:

Was there any assignment between the

entities that had the buy/sell relationship with Miss Farr
10

and Academy Equity?

11

at

Anything like that you have come up with

all?

MR. KUHLMANN: There has been no documents provided.

12
13

We have asked for all corporate documents and all LLC

14

documents.

15

accounting -- I dispute the accounting is not being disputed.

16

Accounting is being disputed in whole just because they

17

didn't follow their own process.

18

provided to us show nothing on assignment, show very little

19

upon the debts that are claimed on the accounting.

20

position that --

But the documents that were

It's our

THE COURT: An independent CPA would look at this and

21
22

We got, frankly, very few on the issue as why the

say, I can't see any debt here at all?
MR. KUHLMANN: It is.

23

That's your position?

And/or, at least, substantiate

24

it.

And, as far as Academy Equity Investors, it's our

25

position that they can't even be represented at this

11

1|

juncture.

It's undisputed that they are an invalid Utah LLC.

2 | And, as the court is aware, if you are not registered in the
3|

state of Utah, you -THE COURT:

MR. KUHLMANN: So, as to Academy Equity Investors who

5|
6|

You don't come into court.

received the lion's share of the funds, we are entitled to

7 | judgment because it's undisputed that there was no buy/sell
agreement.

There is absolutely no debt due to Academy Equity

Investors.

And they are not allowed to appear in this court

today.

What the defendants have tried to do, have said,

well, they are all (inaudible) lay companies, so they kind of
go together.

That's fine if they are separate legal entities

with separate legal obligations and separate assets.
THE COURT:

And your determination is if we are going

to have to try this case -MR. KUHLMANN: (Inaudible.)
THE COURT:

-- your position is if we had to try this

case, that separate entity would show up immediately.

You

would walk in with the articles and the organic documents to
Academy Equity and show the court that they are separate and
apart from the Acres and the Academy at Cedar Mountain,
different entity, show the canceled check that says that they
got the money.

They are now a dissolved entity.

You have a

judgment that you are going to have to go in and take and
probably file an action or amend this action to do a winding

12

1

up of the affairs and try to chase down that money and get it

2

back.
MR. KUHLMANN: Well, we know where the money went.

3
4

Because in the depositions the parties testified, defendants

5

testified the money went to Academy at Cedar Mountain.

6

That's where the money went.

It was payable to Academy

7 I Equity Investors.
THE COURT:
9 I

So, what you would do is take your

judgment and garnish Academy at Cedar Mountain?

10

MR. KUHLMANN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly.

13
14
15

funds.

Exactly.

Try to attach those assets.
Because they received the

And they were not entitled to it.
THE COURT:

And your motion to summary judgment says

I'm entitled to that judgment.

16

MR. KUHLMANN: We are entitled to that judgment.

17

THE COURT:

What about the other payment that did go

18

under the buy/sell agreement?

Do you have a strong agreement

19

or as strong an argument there based upon the independent CPA

20

claim and the statute as well?

21

on more there?

Is that where you are relying

22

MR. KUHLMANN: I think we have it under three things.

23

The statute, the independent CPA claim, and the fact that the

24

buy/sell agreement and the operating documents are nothing

25

more than contract (inaudible).

They are bound to comply

II

with those.

If they don't comply with them, they can't now

2

yell foul, we are entitled to this money.

3 J comply in many respects.

And they didn't

For example, the documents require

that there be an annual statement done that shows the assets
5I

and values of the assets and shows the liability.

6

parties have to, under the documents, unanimously agree on

7 J the valuation.

And the

If it goes two years without a unanimous

agreement on the valuation, then it has to have an appraisal.
Those were never done.
10 I

(inaudible).

11

annual basis.

12

didn't happen.

14

Those weren't done.

They weren't done on an

There was never an appraisal done.

THE COURT:

13

The parties admitted, we put in our

It just

So, the foundation for these claims is

nonexistent?
MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly.

15

Because they didn't comply

16

with their own documents.

17

says that if there's a liability, if there is a negative

18

value, it becomes a debt of the estate; not the trust, but of

19

the estate.

20

assets.

21

The other part of the document

There was no value in this.

The estate had zero

Now, you asked the question about CPA.

22

is a CPA, according to his affidavit.

23

fact, he doesn't even say he's an accountant.

24

says he's an accountant.

25

accounting.

Bruce Hughes

Tom Fuller is not,

In

Tom Hughes

Tom Hughes is the one who did the

We think that's a problem because he's not a CPA

14

1

and because he's not independent.

In fact, if you look at

2 I the accounting, it shows that he's owed money.

And he's put

3

in there $27,000 based on monies he claims to have paid

4

personally and shareholder backpay, which he says was part

5

his backpay.

6

THE COURT:

7J

MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly.

So, it ratifies the lack of independent.
And there is a difference

between being employed by the firm and doing accounting for
9 I

them, or being employed by an independent company to do

10

accounting for an independent firm.

And being an owner in a

11

company that's claiming interest and --

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. KUHLMANN: -- doing the accounting.

Doing the accounting.
The other

14

issue we brought up in the accounting, Your Honor, is the

15

accounting shows, as far as it being undisputed, accounting

16

shows that there is a liability to Cheryl Farr of 11,000

17

bucks.

18

It makes no sense.

19

accounting too that have been brought out.

20

the property is a big issue.

21

sold it.

22
23
24

Cheryl Farr has to pay back part of what she's owed.

THE COURT:

And there are other holes in the
The valuation of

The property is now gone.

They

Is there a cash flow coming from that

sale or has it closed?
MR. KUHLMANN: I don't know, because we have received

25 1 none of those documents.

So, I can't tell you.

But they did

1

testify it sold for over a million dollars; whereas, in the

2

accounting it shows a $495,000 value.

3

accounting.

4

that's kind of the basis of this whole case.

5

has been independent.

6

There are holes in the

The independent issue is a big one because
None of this

None of it.

Now, the argument is, well, if the trust says that we

7 I can pay the debts of the estates.

So, we take the money out,

legitimate and legal debts of the estate.
is no legitimate legal debt (inaudible) .
doesn't take them out of the statute.
comply with the statute.

First of all, there
Second

of all, that

And they still have to

And, thirdly, the statute says it has

to specifically authorize the payment.
authorize the payment, but specifically.
know, it's not defined in the code.

Doesn't just say
Specifically is, you

I have looked for it.

And, but if you look in the dictionary, the normal median says
to name explicitly, explicitly more in detail.
means to specify something.
debts of the estate.

That's what it

All it says is pay the legitimate

That's not a specific designation, which,

especially in this case, where you are paying the same people
that are administering the trust.
THE COURT:

Counsel, if I granted your motion for

summary judgment, wouldn't we still have to try the issue as
to whether or not this is a legitimate debt of the estate?
Apart from the Academy Equity, the one that was paid to the
entities that had the buy/sell?

16

MR. KUHLMANN: I don't know that you would, Your

1
2j

Honor.

3

failure to comply with their agreement in determining the

4

amounts due and in doing annual statements and all of the

5

things that they created in detail in their agreement, their

6

failure to comply with --

7J

If the court were to rule that based upon their own

THE COURT:

So, I can unwind that as well?

MR. KUHLMANN: They didn't comply with the contract.
9 I
10

You can say because you didn't comply with the contract it's
not a legitimate debt of the company.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KUHLMANN: They are a breach of contract.

13

THE COURT:

All right.

So, basically, I could order that Academy

14

Equity, as well as the other entities that received the money

15

from the trust, disgorge those funds?

16

MR. KUHLMANN: I believe so, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

Put them back in the trust.

And then we

18

could at least at that point make the decision -- we don't

19

have to make any decision.

20

trust would then have assets in it that would pass apart from

21

the buy/sell agreements that you say are invalidated?

22

We would refund the trust.

MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly.

The

The third issue here that's

23

been brought up is there have been a claim of consent, that

24

there was consent given.

25

statute --

So, that even if under the old

THE COURT:

1

I looked at that issue, counsel.

And it

2

appeared to be at least a justiciable issue of fact there.

3

MR. KUHLMANN: I mean, you have one side that says

4

yes you didi give (inaudible), the other side says no he

5

didn't.

6

is the statute requires that (inaudible) all beneficiaries,

(inaudible) says, No, I didn't.

7 I not from one.

And the other issue

There is a claim that, well, he was

representing the others in some capacity.
THE COURT:

There is no power found in discovery at

all that he would have,
MR. KUHLMANN: And none was ever given.

(Inaudible)

and what happens, the money went back to pay debts of the
corporate entities Academy Acres and Academy at Cedar
Mountain.

And whether that money went specifically to Bruce

Hughes, Tom Fuller or Tom Hughes, I don't know.

We haven't

seen those documents, haven't been produced through
discovery.

And so, I'm assuming that none of that is

(inaudible) .

So, if they paid corporate entity debt upon

sale that might have went to those three individuals.

We

think it's pretty clear, Your Honor, that at best their
argument is (inaudible).

And if that's what you find, then

maybe Chad Farr's interest doesn't get recouped.

But, again,

that's a disputed issue of fact.
THE COURT:

But if I take the legal position that you

authorize -- that your argument to the court, counsel, Mr.

18

Farr's consent is meaningless because the terms of the
documents themselves were never met and he couldn't consent
3I

to something that was not lawfully done.

4

because of the failure to do the regular statements, the

5

failure to do the valuations on a regular basis, created all

6

of this stuff, it's all ultra various to these corporations?

7

MR. KUHLMANN:

THE COURT:

What was done

Exactly.

Okay.

Anything else you think you need

to clarify for me?
10 1

MR. KUHLMANN: I think we've touched all the issues,

11 I Your Honor.
12

THE COURT:

13

chance to respond to that.

14

receiving the check.

15

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

Mr. Olson, let me give you a
Tell me about the Academy Equity

You bet, Your Honor.

It's true we have

16

three different entities here.

The testimony in depositions

17

was that Academy Equity Investors was formed and was kind of

18

a financial contribution arm of this interrelated group.

19

Essentially, they ran the Academy at Cedar Mountain, which

20

was a private school for teens or residential, (inaudible)

21

residential treatment center.

22

And that's the only business that was being run.

23

entities had all of the same shareholders, all of the same

24

percentages.

25

money was paid.

But they are a private school.

Nothing different there.

All of the

It's true that the

For one reason or another, that there is not

1

a lot of explanation.

2

Equity Investors.

3

as an undisputed fact is that that amount did satisfy the

4

debt to the Academy at Cedar Mountain.

5

becomes here, okay, so, if we have to disgorge the money from

6

Academy Equity Investors back to the trust, the trust just

7

has to turn around and pay the legitimate debts of the estate

8

which includes this debt to the Academy at Cedar Mountain.

9

So, it's just circular.
THE COURT:

10

The check was written out to Academy

We don't deny that.

But what we do have

So, the question

What about the claim that the valuations

11

and the regular organic reviews of the circumstances, these

12

companies, there should have been reports prepared on a

13

regular basis?

14

done it's all annulity?

What about the claim that because that wasn't

MR. OLSON:

15

Well, it's not all annulity.

My

16

recollection of the documents are at the annual meeting there

17

was going to be an established value.

18

common procedure for buy/sell agreements.

19

common with small closely held entities, they don't actually

20

do them.

21

recollection of the document is that it says if it doesn't

22

happen there will be a valuation.

23

the debt's not there.

24

valuation back when.

25

And that's kind of a
Also, what is very

I think that's what happened here.

THE COURT:

But my

Well, it doesn't mean that

It just means that there has to be a

But who does the valuation?

20

MR. OLSON:

1I

I agree that it would have to be an

2 1 independent CPA under those documents.

But the problem we

3

have here, Your Honor, is we have undisputed facts.

4

None of this has been disputed by the other side.

5

disputed one fact in my entire statement of undisputed facts.

6

It has nothing to do with this.

7

accounting.

8

And they said we don't dispute that.

9

dealing with here, Your Honor, is even if we go to trial you

10

are not going to have anything more than what you have right

111

now to make your decision.

12

going back with independent CPA's and doing valuation.

13

are not getting business valuation experts involved to

14

valuate what was the business worth way back when.

15

have is undisputed facts, this is the accounting.

16

was done under the method that was appropriate for

17

determining what the negative value was.

18

disputed.

19

dispute that fact, they have to provide some testimony or

20

evidence that there is a dispute.

21

Okay?

They only

I said this is the

This is what's owed in the undisputed facts.
So, the problem we are

Discovery's done.

That's the fact that you have.

THE COURT:

We are not
We

What you
That it

That has not been
If they want to

Mr. Olson, it doesn't appear to me as

22

though Mr. Kuhlmann is disputing your facts at all.

The

23

records supports everything you are telling me.

24

to me as though Mr. Kuhlmann's position and his client's

25

position is that the agreements, the documents cry against

It appears

21

1

these two checks having been paid because none of the other

2

things that these documents and agreements demanded being

3

done were done.

4

facts, these funds have to be disgorged back to the trust and

5

then these entities have got a real uphill fight trying to

6

prove, if they can at all, and they may not be able to at

So, as a matter of law, under this set of

7 J this point at this time because of the failure to get the
independent valuation, the independent use.
9 1 see Mr. KuhlmannTs argument.

That's what I

It's not really based around

10

the facts at all but, simply, the fact that the law of these

11

documents would force the result that he's asking.

12
13

MR. OLSON:

Well, here's the flaw in that argument,

Your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. OLSON:

The accounting's not that complicated.

16

The account was essentially an accounting of assets versus

17

liabilities.

18

these entities.

19

assets versus liabilities kicks out either a positive figure

20

or a negative figure.

21

It's not that complicated.

22

back and do that.

23

go back and do that.

24

the heirs of Cheryl Farr are not entitled to a windfall to

25

the detriment of her legitimate creditors.

We have books and records from the inception of
It's not that complicated to go back and say

And you divide it by four partners.
The entities will be able to go

An independant accountant will be able to
That being the case, I mean, certainly,

That's not what

22

1

we are suggesting here.

2

suggest that if these are legitimate business debts

3

established by Cheryl Farr before she died agreed to it, are

4

we going to say that because this valuation wasn't done on

5

such and such a dates that the kids are entitled to a

6

windfall and her business partners who contracted with her

7 J are just out in the cold?
THE COURT:
9 J

I can't imagine they would even

It doesn't make any sense.

Counsel, if her business partners who

contracted with her breached the contracts by having failed

10

to perform those key elements of the contracts which were

11

regular valuations, that's a consequence of their breach,

12

isn't it?

13

Probably much more artfully than I just put it.

14

that's what his argument is.

But your position is these

15

documents created contracts.

The contracts had been complied

16

with in the very bottom line; that is, this is what the value

17

is.

18

debt has happened and we are done.

19

I see that's what Mr. Kuhlmann is getting to.

This is what the debt is.

MR. OLSON:

But I see

And the satisfaction of that

Well, that's really my position.

I guess

20

what Your Honor has to sit back and ask yourself is -- let's

21

assume we go to trial on this issue.

22

could we put in front of Your Honor to make a decision in

23

this case?

You know, what more

24

THE COURT:

I think you are right.

25

MR. OLSON:

There is nothing we could put in front of

1

you on this.
THE COURT:

2
3

As we stand now, you are correct.

The

facts are not going to change.
MR. OLSON:

4

Right.

So, I think you are really in a

5

position that you have to look at the undisputed facts as set

6

forth before Your Honor and make a ruling based upon them.

7

The fact of the matter is, that Thomas Hughes made an

8

accounting according to the understandable practice of how

9

that accounting will be done at the date of Cheryl Farr's

10

death.

11

position is these are the figures that any accountant is

12

going to come up with.

13

it's not that complicated.

14

THE COURT:

15

These are the figures that were come up with.

Our

It's liabilities versus debts.

And

And the only facts that we have establish

these liabilities, this debt, and that's done.
MR. OLSON:

16

Right.

And the debts exceeded these

17

assets, therefore, there is a negative value.

18

our agreement, one-quarter of that negative value is a debt

19

against your estate.

20

debts of your estate.
THE COURT:

21

According to

Your trust said pay the legitimate
And that's what was done.

And any left over debt is to the

22

detriment of these entities because they didn't get paid

23

because there was not enough in the trust or the estate to do

24

that?

25

MR. OLSON:

Well, there are other assets of the

1

estate.

But, frankly, you know, no probate was initiated.

And it wasn't done after.
assets that were there.

I mean, these are not the only
There were other assets out there.

You know, I really haven't analyzed this but, arguably, the
entities potentially could go after the estate of Cheryl Farr
for what they are owed.

But I'm not sure that my clients are

in a position of going and getting what inheritance these
kids did get.

But they are not wanting to give up what debts

have been paid either.
10

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, counsel, I do agree with you

11

there is no use trying this case.

Would not do us any good

12

at all to try this matter as it stands now, because this

13

can't be resurrected.

14

valuations and the failure to have the regular reports, we

15

can't go back and make that happen.

16

meaningless act.

The failure to do the regular

It would be a

17

I am going to take this under submission.

18

am going spend some time with my law clerk chewing through

19

both of your arguments.

20

memorandum decision within the next 60 days.

21

clients not to hold their breath because I am going to be

22

very careful in doing this.

23

ready to save up a bunch of money for trial either because I

24

don't think a trial is going to do us any good.

25

have the record we need.

It is well done.

Counsel, I

You will get my
But tell your

But tell your clients not to get

I think we

You have given that to me.

I'll

rule as a matter of law where we stand.
21

MR. OLSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

31

THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

We are in recess

4 | until 11:30.
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i^?.W&.

20

'RUSSEL D. MORGAN, M3SR
LICENSE #87-108442-7801

21
22 MARCH 26, 2008
23
24
25
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD FARR et al,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

Case No. 030500098
BRUCE HUGHES et ah,
Judge James L. Shumate
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed
June 30,2006, and plaintiffs' cross-motion lor summary judgment, filed July 26, 2006.
Argument on the motions was heard November 11, 2006. Having reviewed the parties' motions,
memoranda, and supporting materials, and being fully apprised in the particulars, the Court finds
and rules as follows:
UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. Plaintiffs are the adult children of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr and beneficiaries of the
Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust ("the trust"), dated December 5, 2000. Sheryl Farr died on
October 18, 2001.
2. Defendant Bruce Hughes was named as the successor trustee of the trust and acted as
such upon Sheryl Farr's death.
3. The trust document provides for payment of legal claims in these terms;

6.1, Payment of Expenses, Claims, and Taxes. On my death, my Trustee is
authorized, but not directed, to pay the following:

6.1.2. Legal Claims. Legally enforceable claims against me or my estate.

4. Further, under section 12.4 of trust, the trustee is required to report to the beneficiaries
"at least semiannual 1v

all of the receipts, disbursements, and distributions occurring during the

reporting period, along with a complete statement of the trust property."
5. Defendant The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. ("The Academy"), is a Utah
corporation doing business in Iron County. The Academy operated a private school in Cedar
City. Prior to the death of Sheryl Farr, the shareholders of The Academy, each holding equal
shares, were Sheryl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle.
6. Defendant Academy Equity Investors, LLC ('Academy Equity Investors"), was a Utah
limited liability company; however, the company expired in 2005 for failure to renew. Academy
Equity Investors was organized in order to receive contributions to finance the school as a whole.
Prior to the death of Sheryl Farr, the shareholders of Academy Equity Investors, each holding
equal shares, were also Sheiyl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody
Tuttle.
7. Academy Acres, LLC ("Academy Acres") is a Utah limited liability company.
Academy Acres owned the real estate on wmcn ine Academy operated, rnor to tne aeatn oi
Sheryl Farr, the members of Academy Acres were the same live individuals- Sheryl Farr Bruce
Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle- and each held an equal interest.
8. Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, and Thomas Fuller were the directors of The

2

Academy
9 Exhibit A to The Academy's bylaws, adopted by the directors on January 4, 2000, is a
shareholdei buy-sell agreement with the following provisions [set forth below in the agreement's
own, somewhat Victorian, style of capitalization],
1.3 Transfers at Death. On the death of any Stockholder, the Stockholder's
Personal Representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to The Academy
all the deceased Stockholder's shares in the Company at the Agreement Price and
on the Agreement Terms, as indicated in this section.
1.3.1. The Academy shall have sixty (60) days from the date of the death
of the deceased Stockholder in which to elect to buy all of the Offered
Shares....

1.7 Ownership in Academy Acres. LLC. The Shareholders contemplate the
formation of a real estate Limited Liability Company to be named Academy
Acres, LLC, for the purpose of owning and operating real estate and real property
for the use and lease by The Academy. Any transfer deemed to have occurred
under this Section shall automatically trigger a Buyout of the Stockholder's
ownership in Academy Acres LLC....

2.1 Annual Revisions. Each year the Stoclcholders shall meet and shall review
the Agreement Price. If the Stoclcholders unanimously so agree, they shall modify
the Agreement Price to reflect what they believe to be the then current fair market
value of the Company minus all mortgages, debts, Stockholder loans and accrued
payables of the Company. It is possible, from time to time, that the Agreement
Price will be a negative value, which will represent an obligation of the
transferring Stockholder or their [sic] estate to the company....
2.2. Automatic Adjustment. At the end of each fiscal year beginning after the
date of this Agreement, if the Stoclcholders have not unanimously agreed to an
adjustment in the Agreement Price for two consecutive fiscal years, pursuant to
Section 2.1., the Agreement Price, as most recently adjusted, shall be valued by
appraisal pursuant to Section 2.3.
2.3. How Computed. The Agreement Price will be the fail market value of the
3

Offered Shares as determined by the independent certified public accountant
("CPA") regularly employed by The Academy or, if The Academy has no
regularly employed independent CPA, an independent CPA selected by The
Academy for this purpose. This valuation shall be determined under the same
methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the Offered
Shares if the Offering Stoclcholder had died on the date the offer was deemed
made, ignoring any alternate valuation date (under Code Section 2032) or special
use valuation (under Code Section 2032A)....

3.2. Negative Value Payment Due to The Academy. If the Agreed Value
calculated or agreed to in Section 2 above, is a Negative Value, the terminating
Stoclcholder or their [sic] estate will have an obligation payable to the Company.
3.2.1. Due to the Death of a Stockholder. The Negative Value of the Shares of a
deceased Stockholder shall, to the extent of the death benefit amount of the life
insurance policies that any Stoclcholder has maintained under Section 4, be paid in
cash or by good personal check. Any remaining amount of the Negative Value
shall be a claim against the available assets of the Stockholder's estate.
10. The initial members of Academy Acres also entered into an operating agreement
which was effective as of August 1, 2000. This operating agreement contained a buy-sell
agreement as its Exhibit A. Sections 1.3,1.3.1, 2.3, 3.2, and 3.2.1 of the Academy Acres buysell agreement correspond nearly exactly with sections 1.3, 1.3.1, 2.3, 3.2. and 3.2.1,
respectively, of The Academy's buy-sell agreement; however, Academy Acres' agreement
substitutes "member" for "stoclcholder" and "interest" for "shares,"
11. Stoclcholder/member Thomas Fuller regularly provided and maintained the
accounting books and records of The Academy and Academy Acres. Another stoclcholder/
member, Thomas Hughes, is an accountant, and regularly performed and maintained accounting
books and records for The Academy, Academy Acres, and Academy Equity Investors.
12. Neither Thomas Fuller nor Thomas Hughes is "an independent CPA."

4

13 Upon the death of Sheryl Farr, Thomas Fullei calculated her share of the negative
value of The Academy and Academy Acres.
14. In addition, Thomas Hughes prepared an accounting of The Academy's and
Academy Acres' assets and liabilities. He states in his affidavit that he made a valuation "by the
same methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered shares if the
offering shareholder had died on the date the offer was deemed made, ignoring any alternate
valuation date ... or special use valuation/' as required by the buy-sell agreements.
15. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, The Academy's liabilities exceeded its
assets by $572,716.70 and Academy Acres' liabilities exceeded its assets by $177,861.62. He
determined that the amount of the debt chargeable to the estate of Sheryl Fan was $113,543.34
for The Academy and $35,572.32 for Academy Acres, a total of $349,115.66.
16. Defendant Bruce Hughes transferred $6,000.00 from trust funds directly to The
Academy in partial payment of Sheryl Fair's negative value in that entity. He also paid $ 115,000
of the trust's funds to Academy Equity Investors as partial payment of the decedent's negative
value in The Academy and Academy Acres.
17. Bruce Hughes did not provide an accounting of his actions as trustee to the
beneficiaries of the trust.
18. No annual revisions were made to the agreement price as required by sections 2.1 of
the respective buy-sell agreements; neither was any valuation of the agreement price made by
appraisal as required by sections 2.2 of the respective buy-sell agreements.
19. It is not clear whether The Academy elected to purchase the Sheiyl Fair's shares or
interest within the 60-day provision of the buy-sell agreements at 1.3.1.

5

20, At the time he executed the checks to The Academy and to Equity Investors, Bruce
Hughes held a pecuniary, ownership, and substantial beneficial interest in those companies and
thus personally benefitted from such payment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Utah Uniform Trust Code states, at U.C.A, § 75-7-802 (1) (2006), "A trustee shall
administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries" (emphasis added). The Utah
Supreme Court has also held that the duties of a trustee are extremely exacting: "Executors and
trustees are charged asfiduciarieswith one of the highest duties of care and loyalty known in the
law," Pepper v. ZionsBank, 801 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). Moreover, a
"trustee ha[s] a duty to act with the utmost fidelity to protect and preserve the beneficiaries'
interests,'5 id. (emphasis added). Defendant Bruce Hughes, as trustee, was therefore charged as a
fiduciary with a strict duty of loyalty in his dealings with the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the
trust.
The Uniform Trust Code states further that a transaction "affected by a conflict between
the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable" by an aggrieved beneficiary § 75-7-802
(2), unless, among other exceptions, it is authorized by the terms of the trust, id. at (2)(a). Here it
is undisputed that Bruce Hughes had a personal interest in those entities paid with trust funds.
While the terms of this trust permitted him to use trust funds to pay "legally enforceable claims,"
it does not authorize the trustee to pay those claims unless and until they were legally
enforceable. Neither does it authorize him to pay an amount which may be greater than what is
6

legally enforceable.
The buy-sell agreements do not give rise to an enforceable claim against a deceased
member's o? shareholder's estate until certain conditions are fulfilled. By the agreements' terms
the interest/shares are only deemed to be offered for sale "at the agreement price and on the
agreement terms" (1.3). The agreement price is defined as "fair market value as determined by
the independent certified public accountant" (2.3). Thomas Fullei and Thomas Hughes are not
certified public accountants, nor are they even arguably independent. The Court is particularly
disinclined to waive or ignore the buy-sell agreements' requirement of independence where the
individuals who determined the amount of the debt and the individual who determined it was
proper to pay it all had substantial financial interests at stake.
Accordingly, the Court holds the buy-sell agreements were breached when trust funds
were paid without a determination by an independent CPA. Further, the failure to apprise the
beneficiaries of the trust debts, to provide semiannual accountings, and to obtain any independent
review of the amount of the debt properly chargeable against Ms. Fair's estate represents a
breach of the trustee's duties of loyalty and "utmost fidelity."

ORDER

1. Because of the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and the breach of the buy-sell
agreements, the payment to The Academy and to Academy Equity investors must be
disgorged and returned to the trust.
2. The buy-sell agreements must be followed.
7

3 It remains foi the parties to eithei litigate then obligations undei the buy-sell
agieements, 01 to settle 01 mediate
4 Defendants' motion foi summary judgment is denied

DATED this / /

day of December 2006

BY THE COURT:

The Honorable James L Shumate
Fifth District Court Judge
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**ROBERT

STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

3

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
THE BAILIFF:
continue m

session.

The Court will

Please be seated.

THE COURT:

5

All rise.

Thank you, everyone, we're

6

back on the record for the 20th of February and it is

7

Farr versus Hughes, 030500098.

8
9

Mr. Olson, you are here on behalf of the
defendants.

Even though all your pleadings on this

10

thing say you're attorneys for plaintiff, I know

11

you're attorneys for defendant.

12

to revisit the findings of fact m

13

memorandum decision in this case because as I see it

14

it's your position that the buy-sell

15

provided that there would be a two year

16

period of failure of the parties to agree on a value

17

before there would be a submission to an independent

18

CPA for valuation, and that the agreements were

19

executed in August of 2001 and Mrs. Farr died in

20

October of 2001.

21

of time could not have passed, just as a matter of

22

fact, this agreement had only been m

23

plus days at the time of her death.

You want the Court
the Court's

agreements
continuous

And, therefore, a two year period

place for 60

24

Have I got that right, Counsel?

25

MR. OLSON:

**ROBERT

Pretty close, Counsel.

STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

INC.**

4

Actually the agreements, if I remember correctly,
were signed in the fall of 2000.

So there was about

a year from the time they were signed until the time
of Sheryl Farr's death, but st ill less than the
two-year period.

I think

I've got that right.

But essentially the Court's ruling was
that, hey, we can't call this a legally

enforceable

claim against the estate because the buy-sell
agreements were not complied with.

In fact, looking

at the Court's order on page 7 it says, The buy-sell
agreements do not give rise to an enforceable
against the deceased member or shareholder's

claim
estate

until certain conditions are f ulfilled, one of those
conditions being that it be va lued by an independent
certified public accountant.
THE COURT:

But the prequel to that

condition was that there would be two years go by
without any agreement as to va luation of the asset.
MR. OLSON:
Honor.

That's exactly right, Your

So I think that that p ortion of the

agreements were overlooked.

A nd the Court

correctly

notes in its findings of fact that the agreements
the two different entities are virtually

for

identical

with regard to how we calculat s the agreement price.
The agreement price isn't calculated

**ROBERT

STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

just

1

1 I pursuant to that paragraph 2.3 that's quoted.
2 I Rather, the entire Section 2 goes to how do we
3

calculate the agreement price, and it talks about the

4

annual revisions and it talks about the parties to

5

the agreement, or the members of these entities,

6

coming to an agreement as to value, only if they do

7

not do that for two consecutive fiscal years do we

8

get to the point of needing an independent

9

public accountant.

10

THE COURT:

certified

But as I understand the facts

11

in this case, no action was taken to reach any

12

valuation whatsoever for two successive years at the

13

time that the payments were made from the trust into

14

the entities.

15

MR. OLSON:

But actually that's not

16

correct.

17

Thomas Hughes and Thomas Fuller sat down and made

18

such an accounting, the accounting that was put

19

before the Court in the affidavit -- I believe it's

20

on Ms. Hughes, I get the two confused, or Thomas

21

Fuller.

22

members got together and said, Yeah, that's the value

23

of the entity.

24
25

At the time of the death of Sheryl Farr,

There was an accounting made and all the

THE COURT:

Except, Counsel, how do we get

around this self dealing that seems to be implicit of

**ROBERT

STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

INC.**

1

your interpretation of the documents?

Everybody who

2

is a beneficiary of this particular process is an

3

insider and the Farr trust is locked out in that

4

process, and that's why Mr. Kuhlmann's clients are in

5 I court.
MR. OLSON:

Sure.

And I understand the

Court's concern.
The other problem that we have on the
other end of this equation is how do we put parties
10 I to an agreement that they didn't make?

We have to

11 I look at the buy-sell agreement and we have to abide
12 | by what the parties agreed to do.
13 I

Now, by that same token, I think the way

14

that we solve this problem, obviously in the

15

litigation is, plaintiffs hire their expert, he goes

16

in and looks at the accounting and says You've done

17

correctly or no, it wasn't done correctly.

18

never do that.

19

discovery deadlines have long since passed,

20

never gone in and audited the books to see if this

21

calculation was correct or it wasn't correct.

22

Rather, when we filed for summary judgment and we

23

stated that the undisputed facts are here's the

24

accounting, they didn't deny it.

25

established fact for purposes of summary

**ROBERT

But they

Now, this case is four years old,

STANLEY

So it was an

COURT REPORTING,

/ A n c \

/TOO

^i o A A

they've

judgment

INC.**

7

1 I that this was the calculation of the debt.
2 |

THE COURT:

When it comes to established

3 | facts for summary judgment, what about Mr. Kuhlmann's
4 I argument that there was no compliance with Rule 11
5

and we have a recent Utah Court of Appeals case that

6

really does enforce rules -- I'm sorry, Rule 7, not

7

Rule 11.

8

m

9

makes the argument that there is and there is now

10
11
12
13

Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure

the memorandum going back and forth, Mr. Kuhlmann

supported case law to say that that's got to be done.
MR. OLSON:

I guess I'm not entirely sure

what we're talking about here.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll let Mr. Kuhlmann

14

fill us in.

I understand your argument, Counsel,

15

it's just that I'm not very comfortable with it in

16

view of the insider nature of your accounting.

17

not sure that the agreements say that as I read it.

18

Mr. Kuhlmann, you want to leave it where

I'm

19

it is and you think that Rule 7 has not been complied

20

with, and I'm on solid ground in ruling where I did

21

in that fashion?

22
23

Am I right, Counsel?

MR. KUHLMANN:

Your Honor, I'm at a loss

as well on Rule 7.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. KUHLMANN:

**ROBERT

You --

STANLEY

I don't recall --

COURT REPORTING,

INC.**

1

THE COURT:

You came m

opposition.

with 'your

2

memorandum m

Under Rule URCP 7, each

3

fact -- the defendants failed to dispute such

4

statements m

5

URCP 7, each fact -- in the middle of your second

6

page.

7

memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of

8

summary judgment unless controverted by the

9

responding party.

their responsive memoranda.

Each fact set forth m

factual

Under

the moving party's

That's what you are arguing.

10

MR. KUHLMANN:

11

comfortable with standing on that.

12

I address a couple of the facts, Your Honor?

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. KUHLMANN:

Yes, Your Honor.

And I am

But let me -- can

Go right ahead, Counsel.
We didn't do an audit,

15

you're right.

16

through the expense and incur all of that debt for my

17

clients after we've already lost money when we didn't

18

need to?

19

We didn't need to.

I think, why go

It's very -- it's a very creative

argument

20

that's being made by Mr. Olson, but it's just plain

21

wrong for several reasons.

22

been distinguished here and may be more clear in the

23

Court's findings is that there is one buy-sell

24

agreement that makes any difference m

25

Only one.

And a fact that has not

this case.

Not --

**ROBERT

STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

/ A oc \

r o o

n o A A

INC.**

THE COURT:

Because the other .entity is

not existent .
MR. KUHLMANN:
payment.

The other entity didn't get

There was no payment made to Academy Acresi.

So we don't care.

They didn't buy out the shares.

They didn't cut a check to Academy Acres.

Academy

Acres apparently didn't exercise its right to buy out
the interest.
The check was cut to Academy at Cedar
Mountain where there was a buy-sell agreement.
we're talking about $6,000.

So

The other check was cut

to Academy Equity Investors, who does not have a
buy-sell agreement.

Never did.

There was no

obligation for Sheryl Fuller's estate to pay anything
to them because there was no buy-sell agreement.
wasn't there?

Why

Because the entities controlled by

Mr. Hughes didn't create those documents for
everybody to sign.
The $115,000 simply was not due.
paid to Academy Equity Investors.

That was

Now, what they

have said is, but these are three entities but
they're really all the same.
game or you don't.

Huh-uh, either play the

If you're going to take advantage

of the corporate and limited liability laws of the
State of Utah, you are bound by them.

**ROBERT

STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

They are

INC.**

10

separate, independent agencies.

They're entities

that cannot simply say, Oh, we're going to pay
Academy Equity Investors but it's really money owed
to Academy Acres or Academy at Cedar Mountain.
there was no basis to pay anyway and we don't

So
care

what the buy-sell agreement said for Academy Acres.
THE COURT:

The whole agreement upon which

to make a claim?
MR. KUHLMANN:

Not in Academy Equity

Investors, none, no buy-sell agreement.
The other thing I would like to point out,
Your Honor, is that there is a fairly creative
reading of this document that was created by the
entities.

Not by Ms. Farr, but by the entities.

But

if you'll look at the provision on transfers of debt,
it says the Academy -- this is the Academy at Cedar
Mountain, this is the one that's in existence.

It

says they'll be deemed to have offered to sell to the
Academy all of its C shareholders shares in the
company at the agreed price, which is shown as
defining terms, capital letters, on the agreed terms.
Okay, again capital letters showing it as defined.
Now, if you'll look at the provision on
which they're relying for a two year mandatory
waiting period, it's simply not there.

**ROBERT

STANLEY
/

/i

COURT REPORTING,
"~> r~ \

s~ /O r\

<-i rs

JI

There are

INC.**

1 I three different provisions.

One says annual

2 I revisions and it says how you're going to do it
3

annually.

It says, Each of the stockholders

4

agree -- shall review the -- again, defined term,

5

agreement price.

6

they modify that price, okay?

And it says this is

7

what you're going to look at.

So that's the annual

revision.

shall

If they unanimously agree, then

So they sit down and try and determine the

agreement price.
The second one, 2.2, says automatic
adjustment, and it ties to each fiscal year beginninq
after the date of the agreement as far as it's
starting point.

So beginning at the fiscal year

after the date of the agreement, which according to
the information I think was in the affidavit of Bruce
Hughes, said it was January 4th, I believe, of 2000
when Academy at Cedar Mountain signed their buy-sell
agreement.
So beginning on the fiscal year after
that, then if they have not unanimously agreed under
Section 1 of the annual revision, if they haven't
agreed for two consecutive years, then you appraise
the value as shown in Section 2.3, okay?
THE COURT:

With the independent

MR. KUHLMANN:

**ROBERT

STANLEY

Exactly.

CPA?

But 2.3 is not

COURT REPORTING,

INC.**

1 I part of the two-year provision.

That's 2.2.

In the

2

event -- how do you calculate the defined, quote,

3

agreement price?

4

whether you're doing it annually or whether you're

5

doing it automatically.

6

automatically is if the members can't agree, and it's

7

just telling you, you just do it the same way that

8

the members are doing it.

9

to do it?

10

2.3 tells you how regardless of

The only time that it's done

And how are they

supposed

By an independent certified accountant.
THE COURT:

So you rely on the Court's

11

reading, even if this was the agreement, but it's

12

only talking about $10,000 -- or $6,000 of over

13

$130,000?

14

MR. KUHLMANN:

Exactly, Your Honor.

I

15

mean -- and the Court's ruling is not just based on

16

this agreement.

17

accounting by the trustee, the trustee didn't act for

18

the benefit of the beneficiaries, finds that there

19

was conflict of interest, all of which, regardless of

20

this agreement, justified voiding the transactions

21

and bringing the money back into the estate and

22

charging the trustee with attorney's fees for it.

In here it finds there was no

23

So I don't think there's a problem here.

24

THE COURT:

25

Counsel, does the court's

findings miss the difference between the entities and

**ROBERT

STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

/A 1 Z \

(ZOO

1 O A A

INC.**

1 I the fact that the check went to an

entity that did

2 | not have a buy-sell?
3 |

MR. KUHLMANN:

I think it is a little

4 I unclear because it talks about both the agreements
5

with Academy at Cedar Mountain and Academy Acres.

6

There is a comment that Academy Equity Investors was

7

in place and went out of existence in 2005, and it

8

does say that it went there.

9

this, it tended to -- I don't think Academy Acres has

10

any basis for anything.

11

But as I read through

They didn't get payment.

I mean, it's kind of been a mix of trying

12

to say, Well, they were all the same entities, and

13

that's kind of what the defendants' position has been

14

throughout the case.

15

claim whatsoever, and it --

16

THE COURT:

But I don't think they have a

Should I modify the findings

17

and the final order to reflect the distinct point

18

that you brought up at argument, Counsel?

19
20

MR. KUHLMANN:
Your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. KUHLMANN:

23
24
25

I think it may -- may help,

All right.
My guess this case may go

up on appeal, and I think it may help to make that
distinction.
THE COURT:

**ROBERT

All

STANLEY

right.

That's

COURT REPORTING,

your

INC.**

1

position.

2

And, Mr. Olson, you take the position that

3

your reading is the accurate one and that this

4

tripwire simply was never tripped?

5

MR. OLSON:

Well, exactly, Your Honor.

6

And I would like to address this other entity

7

as well.

8

nauseam when we came in for summary judgment.

issue

In fact, I think we argued it probably ad

9

We never disputed the fact that the

10

payment went to Academy Equity Investors, LLC, and

11

that that entity wasn't owed under the buy-sell

12

agreements.

13

for summary judgment was that it went to pay off the

14

debt at Academy Acres, LLC.

15
16
17

But the undisputed fact from our motion

THE COURT:

So it was paid in behalf of

MR.- OLSON:

I mean, the best corollary if

Acres, LLC?

18

Mr. Kuhlmann owes me $10 and I owe you $10, and I say

19

Mr. Kuhlmann pay it to Judge Shumate, what's the

20

problem with doing that?

21

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

22

MR. OLSON:

They haven't suggested

that

23

that this isn't exactly what happened.

24

clients conceded, Yeah, the money that went to

25

Academy Equity Investors, LLC, went to the debt of

**ROBERT

STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

In fact, my

INC.**

1 I Academy Acres, LLC, no big deal.
2 |

So it's really of no consequence what

3 I entity it went to, as long as the debt's satisfied.
4 I

THE COURT:

And as far as you look at it,

5

the real issue is whether or not that tripwire has

6

been met?

7

MR. OLSON:

Yeah.

So, you know, really

8

getting back to the tripwire issue, Mr. Kuhlmann has

9

taken us to the on account of death of a shareholder

10

or member that it's going to be paid according

to the

11

agreement price, and then he takes you directly to

12

2.3, saying, Hey, it says agreement price is

13

calculated this way.

14

But if we look at Section 2, the very

15

title of that entire section is agreement price.

16

It's not just 2.3 how we calculate it, it T s not jusr

17

the two year independent CPA rule; rather, it's the

18

annual revisions, the automatic adjustment, and then

19

if two years go by, two fiscal years go by, without

20

an agreement as to price, we get to the CPA.

21

never got there.

22

How can there be an

THE COURT:

We

agreement

23

as to price when Mrs. Farr is deceased after the

24

first year and her legal representatives through her

25

trust are no longer there?

**ROBERT

STANLEY
A

COURT REPORTING,
-> r~ \

/- r> r>
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A

A
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MR. OLSON:

You know, and I agree that's

an interesting question.

At the time of her death

her shares are deemed offered for sale to the entity
at this price.
And you're right under the agreement, how
do we determine what that price is?
members agree.

Well, the

We have four remaining members in

that entity, and the members agreed on what the price
was .
THE COURT:

Counsel, since your

entities

drafted the agreement and there appears to be at
least some ambiguity as to how one looks at that
agreement under the facts of this case, Mrs. Farr
having died within the first two-year block, doesn't
the agreement get construed against you?
MR. OLSON:

Well, the problem, Your Honor,

is that Sheryl Farr, and really Mr. Kuhlmann's
clients are an extension of Sheryl Farr, was in on
the drafting.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. OLSON:

I mean, everybody on this case

was a draftsman.

The heirs of Sheryl Farr may not

have been, but they're not parties to that
either.

agreement

Sheryl Farr was a party to the agreement, as

were Mr. Hughes, Mr. Fuller, the other Mr. Hughes,

*'ROBERT

STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

1

and Ms. Tuttle.

2

agreements, they all entered into them, they all

3

signed them.

4

They were all the draftsmen of these

So there is not any party to construe it

5

against as, you know, Ms. Farr was a part of this ag

6

well.

7

THE COURT:

I see your point.

8

MR. OLSON:

Now, the only other issue

9

that -- I mean, essentially we filed summary

judgment

10

under one

11

interest statute.

12

says -- there's basically a couple of exceptions

13

where the self dealing may occur.

That's when the

14

trust authorizes the transaction.

And that's the

15

argument we were making, the trust authorized

16

of legally enforceable claims.

17

the parties consented.

18

addressed.

19

that issue remains to be litigated.

20

of the two prongs of the conflict of
The conflict of interest

statute

payment

The other one was if

That issue hasn't been

We certainly assert that they did, and

So I think the Court needs to understand

21

that before we start issuing summary judgment on the

22

entire case.

23

believe that there is certainly evidence that will

24

suggest at the very least Chad Farr consented to

25

this, knew full well what was going

That issue hasn't been addressed.

**ROBERT

on.

STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

We

1 I

The other issues that I think the Court

2 I needs to address if the Court is going to deny my
3

motion today, and I can't think of any reason why

4

they would.

5

motion today, where I'm a little curious in the

6

Court's order it says the buy-sell agreements must be

7

followed and remain from litigation, and I'm a little

8

unclear as to what the Court was intending there.

9

Are we not, then, going back and saying, okay, we

'But if the Court is going to deny my

10

need to find out whether the calculation was the

11

right calculation?

12
13

THE COURT:

That's the way I saw it,

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

Counsel.

14

And so I guess under

15

that theory, if we continued in litigation under the

16

Court's order as set, we come into the court, we put

17

on the evidence of whether that figure was the right

18

figure.

19

money to be paid back.

20

then there's money to be paid back.

If it was the right figure, there is no
If it was the wrong figure,

21

THE COURT:

22

with the money in the meantime?

23

order says to pay it back into the trust and to hold

24

it until the trust until that litigation is done, we

25

figure out what the price is.

**ROBERT

And the issue is what do we do
And the Court's

STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.

**

1 I

MR. OLSON:

Right.

2 I

THE COURT:

That's the way I see the

3

litigation coming out.

I don't see this case having

4

been dissolved -- or resolved by my summary judgment .

5

MR. OLSON:

And, of course --

6

THE COURT:

In fact, I have to say since

7

she's here in the courtroom, my clerk and I both came

8

to that conclusion at the time we were going over

9

this order specifically, we decided that the next

10

step is to find out what is the price.

11

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

And then the only issule

12

with regard to disgorgement, obviously, is, I mean,

13

this payment was made back in '03.

14
15

THE COURT:

That's not an issue for the

Court, Counsel.

16

MR. OLSON:

And I understand, and where

17

does the money come from, is the question?

18

Equity Investors doesn't have it, it was paid to

19

creditors.

20

find it.

21
22
23
24
25

Academy

I mean, we can't go back to creditors and

THE COURT:

Academy Equity

Investors

better find a line of credit.
MR. OLSON:

Well, and I understand

where

Your Honor is coming from.
I guess the last point I would ask, Your

* PROBERT STANLEY

COURT REPORTING,

INC. * *

20

1

Honor, if the order is going to stand despite the

2

motion being filed, would the Court

3

certifying it as a final order?

4

THE COURT:

entertain

I can't, Counsel, not when my

5

order itself says that we have to litigate the issue

6

of whether or not the buy-sell agreements have been

7

appropriately met.

8

and an expert suggested by the plaintiffs comes in

9

and looks at what your clients did and said, yeah,

It may be moot if you're right

10

that's the way you value it and they were right, then

11

we're done.

12
13
14

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

Fair enough, Your

THE COURT:

It's, again, the place that my

Honor

15

clerk and I got to was exactly where you're talking

16

about, Counsel --

17

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

18

THE COURT:

-- as we looked at it.

19

MR. OLSON:

Thank you.

20

THE COURT:

Thanks, everyone.

21
22

The motion

is overruled and denied.
And, Counsel, in view of the fact that the

23

court summary judgment has rather now narrowed

24

scope of our litigation, I think we probably ought to

25

get a scheduling order for that evaluation and

**ROBERT

STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

our

1

litigation.

2

scheduling order within the next 20 days?
MR. OLSON:

3
4

Can the two of you sit down give me a

I would take it that the

discovery deadlines are being
THE COURT:

5

extended?

The discovery deadlines have

6

to be extended so you can get out and get some expert

7

testimony on this.

8

MR. OLSON:

Yeah, we can extend our order.

9

THE COURT:

You may want to get your own

10

independent expert who's going to say exactly what

11

your people said.

12

MR. OLSON:

Correct.

13

THE COURT:

Mr. Kuhlmann might find that

14

he can't find one, in which case this case is over

15

with.

16

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

17

THE COURT:

Thanks, everyone.

18

MR. OLSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

**ROBERT
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3

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT:

That's everything for another 10 minutes,

4

unless, Mr. Olson and Mr. Kuhlmann, you really want to talk

5

with me about the Farr and Hughes case now.

6

want to wait for your clients to get here?

But maybe you
Do they want to

7 I be here, do you know?

91

MR. OLSON:

My clients are here.

THE COURT:

All right.

Ready to go.

Mr. Kuhlmann?

10

MR. KUHLMANN: Ready to go forward.

11

THE COURT:

Counsel, let's use the time productively.

12

Since we are ready to go, let me pull the file up.

13

give me just a second.

14

grab my courtesy copies off the desk because I have made some

15

notes on those.

16

Everybody keep going.

17
18

Counsel,

I'm going to take a recess and go

I'll be right back.

Don't stop (Inaudible).

(Whereupon, an off the record discussion took place.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's go back to work.

Mr. Olson,

19

this is cross-referenced for summary judgment.

But I think

20

you were the first in time so you get the first in right.

21

I see it, the last time we addressed this case in February of

22

2007, we had a pretty detailed discussion as to what was left

23

in the litigation after the court's order on the motions for

24

summary judgment.

25

not there was a justiciable issue that needed to be tried

As

And the concern that I had was whether or

1

regarding the value that would be established from the

2

buy/sell agreements.

3

amended scheduling order there was no designation of an

4

expert by the plaintiffs, and you did have an expert review

5

this matter who differed with Mr. Hughes' calculation by

6

about $14,000, as I recall, but with no evidence on the other

And your position is that after the

7 I side, that your client would be entitled to summary judgment
based upon the valuations as you saw them in that review by
the CPA.
10 I

MR. OLSON:

If I can clarify it a little bit.

Maybe

11

walk us through it a little bit here, Your Honor.

12

motion for summary judgment last year that brought us to that

13

December order.

14

here's what the calculations are.

15

paragraphs and summary judgment.

16

Affidavit from the person making them, who was my client.

17

Said these are the figures.

18

of those numbered paragraphs.

19

was these are the figures.

20

the figures.

21

said the buy/sell agreements need to be followed.

22

remaining issue to litigate is the obligations under the

23

buy/sell.

24
25

We filed a

And, at that point in time, our argument was
Put them in numbered
Here's what they are.

There was no opposition to each
And our position at that time

No one contested that they were

Nonetheless, the court's order on December 6th
The only

We filed a motion to alter or amend because we
disagreed with some of the reasoning of the court and wanted

to make sure that we had it clear there was a conflict that
2

we saw.

That brought us into a hearing on February 20th.

3

And in that hearing we asked for clarification as to exactly

4

where we stand.

5

transcript of that hearing.

6

deny my motion today, where ITm a little curious in the

7

court's order it says, 'The buy/sell agreement must be

8

followed and remain free from litigation.1

9

curious as to what the court was intending there.

In fact, the question was -- I got a
"But if the court is going to

And I am a little
Are we not

10

then going back and saying, okay, we need to find out whether

11

the calculation was the right calculation?"

12

Court responded, "That's the way I see it."

13

So that the only thing left for trial in this case was

14

the calculation, right?

15

the money.

16

is and adjust the money.

If it was, then the defendants keep

If it was wrong, then we need to figure out what it

17

So, I went on to state, "So, I guess with that theory

18

we continue under the litigation as the court's order as set.

19

We come into court, put on the evidence as whether that was the

20

right figure.

If it was the right figure, there is no money to

21

be paid back.

If it was the wrong figure, then there is money

22

to be paid back."

23

And so, I think we had an understanding of where we

24

were going from here.

Now, based upon that framework, the

25

court said, "We need to have somebody to come in and testify

5

1

as to what this calculation is.

2

What's the deal?

Is it right?

Is it wrong?

My argument, that point was we'll listen.

3 I Expert discovery deadlines have run.

Mr. Kuhlmann's client,

Chad Farr, in deposition said, I have no basis to suggest
5 1 this calculation is wrong.
6

calculation.

They have no way to dispute the

So, my point back then was, case is over.

7 I Plaintiff has the burden of proof.
calculation is wrong.

They can't prove the

All we have is my client saying this

is the calculation and no evidence otherwise.

The court's

decision at that point in time was let's get an expert in to
take a look at it.

The court extended discovery deadlines.

And -THE COURT:
look at it.

You went out and grabbed Mr. Hinton to

And plaintiff never got anybody.

MR. OLSON:

Well, actually, in all fairness, what

happened, the court entered an amended scheduling order in
April that provided for a April 30th deadline for plaintiffs
to designate and a June 15th deadline for them to produce a
report.

On April 30th, they did designate David Basal, CPA,

as their expert.
no report.

But June 15th came and went.

My clients were never contacted.

designation at all whatsoever.

And there was
There was no

We did designate Mr. Hinton.

And even though June 15th came and went, of course, we were
looking at it and saying we've got no report to rebut.
nonetheless, let's have him take a look at it.

But,

We only have

6

1

a one month time frame under the amended scheduling order.

2 1 Obviously, because we intended rebuttal.

We would have a

3

report from another expert.

4

yeah, it flies or it doesn't fly.

5

running brand new with your experts to go in and take a look

6

at the thing.

7

THE COURT:

Our guys would sit down and say,
Whether we hit the ground

So, in lieu of a designated report, you

8

have Mr. Hinton's affidavit.

9

report because he said this is what I looked at.

10
11

what I saw.

And that would serve as a
This is

These are the values.

MR. OLSON:

Yeah.

I agree with that.

And even one

12

more, Your Honor.

13

plaintiffs have the burden of proof in this case.

14

still back to where we were a year ago, that they have not

15

got one shred of evidence, not one bit of testimony they can

16

put on to say that the calculation is wrong.

17

helps corroborate, but he's not even necessary.

18

THE COURT:

We don't need Mr. Hinton's report.

The

We are

So, Mr. Hinton

Well, counsel, I guess my real concern is

19

the effect of the statute on this transaction.

And when the

20

statute is brought into play, is if there is a circumstance

21

of potential self-dealing, which is exactly what the court

22

was concerned about here.

23

self-dealing, which I have, and ordered the disgorgement of

24

the funds, which I have, then doesn't that establish a

25

shifting of the burden of proof, the court having found that

And if the court finds

1

there was the threshold of self-dealing that Mr. Kuhlmann's

2

clients were complaining about?

3

back saying, well, even if there is the appearance of

4

self-dealing, we are still entitled to these funds under

5

these agreements.

And then your clients coming

And doesn't that shift the burden of proof

6 1 at that stage when the court's orders them basically granting
7

partial summary judgment, establish that line?

So, basically

8

where we stand today is that you have your CPA, Mr. Hinton,

9

has looked at it, varied from Mr. Hughes' calculation by less

10

than 10 percent, 1 think something like that, or around

11

10 percent.

12

information.

13

things, but they were still proper under the agreements.

14

may have appeared to be self-dealing, but we are still

15

entitled to these dollars under these agreements.

16

entitled to have this interest paid out under the agreement.

17

Isn't that basically where we stand with it?

18

And you are ready to go to trial now with that
You can establish that, yeah, we did these

MR. OLSON:

It

And we are

Well, I think you are pretty close, Your

19

Honor, except I don't think there is any law that says the

20

burden of proof switches to the defendants in this case.

21

Now, I went into that in some great deal in my reply.

22

THE COURT:

I did spend some quality time with it.

23

MR. OLSON:

I think what we need to understand is,

24

under the statute, if the court finds that there is a

25

conflict of interest, it makes the transaction voidable.

Not

8

1

void.

It makes it voidable, which means we need to look at

2

it and say is it a transaction that should have happened or

3

is it a transaction that shouldn't have happened.

4

THE COURT:

And if it should have happened, how much.

5

MR. OLSON:

Exactly.

6

Exactly.

Now, the only

potential burden that shifts is a burden of persuasion.

7 J doesn't put a preponderance on my client's shoulders.
still the defendant in this case.

It
He's

Rather, he needs to come

9 1 through with evidence which is just a burden of persuasion to
10

show this is a legitimate debt.

11

saying this is how we calculated it, this is what the books

12

and records say, he's met his burden of persuasion.

13

plaintiff has to come back and say no, it's wrong.

14

can't do that.

15

they could have done that.

16

stage of the game to say my clients' calculation is wrong.

17

think Mr. Hinton certainly corroborates what my client is

18

saying.

19

His own coming forward and

Now,
And they

If they had an expert examine it, perhaps
But they have nothing at this

But I just don't think it's necessary.
So, as we sit here today, almost a year later,

20

plaintiffs, and, again, I think it's important to note that

21

plaintiffs' experts were not for rebuttal purposes.

22

establishing their case.

23

plaintiffs first to designate an expert, then defendants to

24

designate an expert.

25

I

It was for

The scheduling order clearly required

Now, plaintiffs are going to come in and argue

1

saying, well, we didn't need an expert until we got the

2

defendant's report and had something to rebut.

3

not true.

4

rebuttal deadline.

5

succeed in this case.

6

hearing says, you know, Mr. Olson, you may want to get out

7

and get an expert of your own.

8

plaintiffs, you need to go out and get an expert.

9

Your Honor stated it may be moot if you are right.

Well, that's

The scheduling order never even gave them a
They had to produce an expert in order to
In fact, if the court in the last

It clearly stated that,
In fact,
"And an

10

expert suggested by the plaintiffs comes in and looks at what

111

your clients did, and said, yeah, that's the way you value

12

it, and they were right, then we are done.1'

13 1

That's exactly where we sit here today.

They haven't

14

produced that person to say the calculation for right or

15

wrong, so it's moot.
THE COURT: Well, counsel, Mr. Kuhlmann's named an

16
17

expert.

He's given you the name.

He hasn't given you a

18

report.

You didn't give a report back either.

19

than filing over the reports now, I find this in the shape of

20

summary judgment.

21

I'm not sure that summary judgment is going to be where we

22

need to go with it.

23

trial calendar, let the experts come in and testify.

24

want to get reports back and forth you can file motions for

25

orders to compel and we'll get a report back and forth.

And rather

And where this is a procedural dispute,

I think we just need to get it on a
If you

10

Frankly, I don't think your client needs to file a
report because of the affidavit that you filed is sitting
here.

And I'm not inclined to strike that affidavit based on

Mr. Kuhlmann's reply memorandum.

I think that's basically

information that would be discoverable anyway, and the fact
that it's in affidavit form just puts it before the court
more easily.

But it appears to me as though we need to get a

trial date set and go through this and walk through this
whole process and say looking at Article II of this
agreement, as we go through and evaluate the values of these
various members' contributions, and their liabilities or the
liabilities of their estates, don't we need to just go
through and establish what it is and the court's ruling is
the law of the case now as far as whether or not this one
tripped the statute?
trip the statute.

Because I th ink it did.

I think it did

And now we have to determine whether or

not this transaction is voidable.

I have already unbound it.

But whether there is an entitlement there, is really what we
are looking at.

And that is circl ing around what the statute

talk:s about, avoidable transaction

So,

isn' t it just time

to cfet this case set for trial and let the wi tnesses come in
and testify and the court makes th e findings?
MR. OLSON:

The only probl em with that theory, Your

Honor, is what is plaintiff's expe rt going to say?
abso lutely no investigation.

He's done

He's not looked at the books

11

1

and records of the defendant.

2

opinion on anything.
THE COURT:

3

He's got no basis to make any

Not only that -But I don't know that, counsel.

Maybe

4

you want to get his reports so you can find out what his

5

report is.

6

going to say.

7I

But without a report, I don't know what he's

MR. OLSON:

Well, that's --

THE COURT:

And that's why summary judgment may be

bringing the cart before the horse.
MR. OLSON:

10 J

Well, and that's true, Your Honor.

But I

11

guess what's curious is we had a report deadline.

12

deadline's come and past.

13

Rule 26(a)(3), witness and expert's testimony to his report,

14

there is no report.

15

absolutely nothing.
THE COURT:

16
17

That

We don't have a report.

So, it limits his testimony to

And maybe you'll win your case on a

motion in limine as opposed to a motion for summary judgment.
MR. OLSON:

18

Well, perhaps that's the route, Your

19

Honor.

You know, having been the unfortunate losing party in

20

Pete vs. Youngblood at the court of appeals, if the report's

21

not there and not properly designated, it doesn't come in.

22

THE COURT:

Um-hmm.

23

MR. OLSON:

And, you know, I got the short end on

24

that one.

And I remember it well.

So, I don't see between

25

now and the time we get to trial there's going to be any

12

1

difference in testimony or facts than what the court has

2

before it today, which is nothing.

3

wasting our time going to trial.

4

court's concerns are and where you are going with it.
THE COURT:

5
6

So, I think we are
But I understand what the
But --

I guess my real concern is, counsel, when

we go to trial I want to give you a final judgment.

I want

7 I to have something that's established not on affidavits, not
on arguments of counsel, not on records other than what was
heard at trial, and make this one final and enforceable at
10 1 that point.
11

That's really what my concern is.

Mr. Kuhlmann, I know you want to say various things

12

about this whole process.

13

trial.

14

think these are the right parties in interest.

15

read your memoranda with real care.

16

testimony to establish that this agreement that we have here

17

is operable against either the estate or the trust?

18

find after the testimony comes in that this agreement that we

19

are dealing with only goes to the estate, then I dismiss it

20

at that point, motion for judgment, directed verdict?

21

But I still think we have to go to

Mr. Kuhlmann, you don't think we do because you don't
And I did

But don't I need

MR. KUHLMANN: I think that's (inaudible).

And if I

I don't

22

think we need to go to trial because you have already ruled

23

and we are done.

24

There are four causes of action in the complaint.

25

them is to void the transaction, which you have already done.

That's what I think.

And this is why.
One of

13

1

You have already found conflict of interest.

2

already, more importantly, found that the entities claiming

3

their, (inaudible) buy/sell agreements, violated that

4

buy/sell agreement by not valuing the claim the way they were

5

supposed to.

6

enforceable claim because they failed to comply with their

7

own contract.

8

already ordered disgorgement of those funds.

9
10
11

And you have

So, they did not have as you found, a legally

Based on that, that one's gone.

And you have

Count two's restitution only against Bruce Hughes.
You ordered that.

That's already taken place.

Count three, or excuse me, count two is accounting,

12

which has never occurred.

13

know that we care.

But with the disgorgement, I don't

14

Count three is restitution, which you have ordered.

15

Count four is damages, which I don't think the court

16

is going to grant us anyway.

17

the only thing in the counterclaim is for trustee's time,

18I

fees or time.

19

There is a counterclaim.

And

Now, another important issue of this case, Your

20

Honor, is that the majority of the amount in dispute was paid

21

to Academy Acres.

22

THE COURT:

Well, counsel, the argument was made that

23

this was paid to Academy Acres in order to satisfy a debt

24

that was owed to Academy Acres by the entity that was

25

entitled to receive under this distribution.

14

MR. KUHLMANN: It was, Your Honor.

1

And that while

2

it's an interesting argument, if you can find anywhere in

3

anything filed before this court other than counsel's

4

argument that that's the case, I'll agree that they made that

5

claim.

6

of their motions for summary judgment.

7

of Bruce Hughes, if you read through that, it talks about

8

paying to the Academy entities.

9

the documents here if you want to look at them -- let me

But there is not a statement of fact to that in any
The initial affidavit

If you look at, and I've got

10

present them to you and you can go through them because

11

you'll see, Your Honor, that that argument, that comment is

12

simply not true.

13

give you the accounting that they have done, the promissory

14

notes that that accounting refers to and part of Mr. Hughes'

15

deposition that was taken in this case.

16

It can't be true.

Based on -- I'm going to

If you start with the accounting on page 2, it lists

17

the itemization of what is owed to Academy Acres.

What I

18

have given Your Honor is three of the items that are listed.

19

One is the nasty shade note.

20

the (inaudible) note.

21

those aren't Academy Equity Investors.

22

shows debt there.

23

There is nothing that's been shown that Academy Acres owed

24

Academy Equity Investors anything.

25

have been listed on this accounting because it was a debt of

The large and trust note and

If you look at those three notes,
There is nothing that

Those are strictly Academy Acres debts.

If they had, they would

15

1

the company.

2

yeah, Academy Acres on this case is because Academy Equity

3

Investors wasn't ever in existence for any substantial

4

purpose.

5

buy/sell agreement.

6

The reason they used Academy Acres is, or,

And it didn't do any business and didn't have a

If you look at the deposition of Bruce Hughes talking

7

about why he made these payments and who was being paid, he

8

says as far as Academy Investors goes, this is on page 44, we

9

originally started developing property, formed Academy Acres,

10

also formed Academy Equity Investors, associated with Academy

11

Acres, and we since not used Academy Equity Investors, we

12

just used Academy Acres.

13

doing any business.

14

you look at the bottom of that page starting line 22, "So,

15

Academy Equity Investors was set up and didn't do anything?"

16
17

So Academy Equity Investors wasn't

He says the same thing on page 45.

"Well, it did for about six months period.

If

Then we

just folded it into Academy Acres."

18

On page 46, "Did you file articles of dissolution?"

19

"No.

20

We hadn't filed articles of organization with

Academy Equity Investors."

21

"You had not?"

22

"We had not."

23

If you look at page 53, "So, what's the difference

24

between that and what Academy Equity Investors was to do?"

25

"Over time, there essentially became no difference,

1

which is why we didn't continue with Academy Equity
Investors.

Initially, we thought there would be a

distinction, but it turned out to be not."
"When did you use Academy Investors?"
"We didn't ever file a tax return for them, so it
would have been by the end of the year 2001.

It's created in

2001."
THE COURT:

Prior to Mrs. Farr's death?

MR. KUHLMANN: Mrs. Farr died in October 2001.

You

10

have a month and-a-half -- or, excuse me, two and-a-half

11

months of time between the time she died and the time that

12

this company wasn't renewed.

13

No tax return filed, Your Honor.

14

$115,000, isn't that income if it was money owed from Academy

15

Acres?

16

page 69, "At the time they were issued, what was the $115,000

17

paid?"

18
19

Well, if they received

And if you look at what he did with the money on

"It just went into the account.

I don't know that it

paid anything specifically."

20
21

Just never did anything else.

"Why was the check issued?

What was the purpose of

it?"

22

"To pay that obligation."

23

"To pay what?"

24

"To pay this obligation."

25

By that, you are referring to the invoice where it

17

1

shows $149,000, roughly dollars due?11

2
3

It didn't go to Academy Acres.

It went to pay what it

said was owed between all the companies.
the 115 was an obligation?1'

4

"So,

5

"Yes."

6

Then, down further on the page, "So, just to make

7

sure I'm understanding, 115,000 was to pay a portion of the

8

invoice, the amount based on the documents that you

9

understood required the estate to pay their share of debt?"

10

Answer is, "Yes."

11

He's not talking about, well, it went to Academy

12

Acres or Academy Investors, because Academy Acres owed the

13

money, because that's why we have Academy Acres documents and

14

their balance sheets and final documents to determine that

15

amount.

That is simply not true.

16

Finally page 72, "And they were paid $6000?"

17

"Well, who the checks were written to was not a

18

function of the specific amounts here.

The debt and the way

19

all this functioned was they were interrelated at this

20

point,"

21

(inaudible).

22

Mr. Hughes affidavit.

23

entities are all interrelated.

24

not once does it say anything about Academy Acres owing money

25

to Academy Equity Investors.

their claim from the start has been well
And that's replete in the documents.
That's what he said.

Look to

He says these

You look at that document and

Nowhere.

The claim was, well,

18

1

it's kind of a pool.

2

three different businesses but we treated them as one.

3

That's what he's saying.

4

We were all the same owners.

You have already ruled, Your Honor.

We had

Now, let me step

5

back one point.

You have already ruled that from the trust

6

perspective under the statute, the transaction is voidable.

7 J And the money has come back.
come back.
9 I

It's sitting there, but it's

Any claim by Academy Acres, Academy at Cedar

Mountain, Academy Equity Investors must be based upon a claim

10

they have raised.

11

original calculations were invalid.

12

until they raise that claim and prove that claim.

13

no claim before you.

14

defendant's side is a counterclaim for trustee's fees which I

15

don't think Your Honor can award based upon the fact that you

16

found there was a breach of fiduciary duties here, because it

17

was an interested transaction.

18

determine.

19

You have already determined that the
There is no valid claim
There is

The only claim before you on the

There is nothing else to

Nothing.

They haven't raised their claim.

If there was a

20

counterclaim like anywhere defendants saying, wait a minute.

21

Not only are we owed this money but we are owed more.

22

they aren't saying that in any of their documents we are owed

23

more than this.

24

before this court, then I would agree with you we have to go

25

to trial.

And

If they had that, any type of claim asserted

But once you have determined that the trust was

1

breached by self-dealing, once you have determined that these

2

defendants failed to comply with their own contract, there is

3

nothing else for us to prove.

4

contract, which means the estate owes nothing.

5

owes nothing until they comply with their contract.

6

can't do it now.

7

limitation ran in '04. And it's clear in the buy/sell

They are in breach of

They are too late.

The trust
They

She died in '01.

That

agreements themselves that the only entity liable for that
debt is the estate.
10 I

Now, the claim's been made, well, yeah, the estate,

11

the creditors can go after assets in a revocable trust on the

12

date of.

13

they haven't done it.

And it is on the date of death.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. KUHLMANN: Yeah.

That's true, but

Time period has run.
They haven't done it.

16

(Inaudible.)

There is nothing else to determine here, Your

17

Honor, except the amount of attorney's fees and interests due

18

the plaintiffs because of the self-dealing transfer and the

19

time that has run while that money has been held.

20

only thing to determine.

21

think you hit it on the nose with regard to nobody produced

22

anything.

23

The required reports and the order drafted by Mr. Olson said

24

we are required to file the reports.

25

Rule 26 don't include dealing with anything in impeachment.

That's the

The accountings are irrelevant.

I

We don't have anything to produce, Your Honor.

The filed reports under

20

1

And that's the only thing we have to deal with.

2

don't have to prove what they may or may not be owed because

3

you have already decided they breached their agreement.

4

if they breached their agreement, they are not entitled to

5

recover one dime in Utah law until they cure that.

6 I are too late to cure that now.
THE COURT:

All right.

Because we

And

And they

We are done.
And, Mr. Olson, you think you

are entitled under your summary judgment motion right now.
MR. OLSON:
10 I argument.

Yes, Your Honor.

It's a curious

Essentially, what Mr. Kuhlmann is arguing here is

11

that you ordered disgorgement of the funds.

12

now have $121,000 in their hands.

13

didn't sue them for that money, they can't get it.

14

other words, we had to bring a claim to sue them for money

15

that we already had at the time this claim was brought.

16

mean, that argument doesn't make sense, Your Honor.

17

no way to predict, well, the judge might make us disgorge

18

this money so we should sue them for the money we already

19

have.

20

The plaintiffs

And because my clients
So, in

I

We had

It doesn't make sense.
I think the defendants are really confusing the

21

difference, Your Honor, the difference between a void

22

transaction and a voidable transaction.

23

voided anything.

24

voidable.

25

fact, defendants made this same argument back in court in

Your Honor has not

The statute specifically states that it is

It is not void.

So, the case is not over.

In

1

February that were before the court, we don't need the

2

accounting.

3

didn't do an audit.

4

think why go through the expense and incur all of that debt

5

for my clients after we already lost money when we didn't

6

need to.

They said the very same thing.

They said we

You are right, we didn't need to.

I

It goes on to argue that we don't need an

7 I accounting because of the conflict of interest.

Well, the

court quickly corrected that and said Mr. Kuhlmann may not be
able to find an expert that will come in here and say that
10 | accounting is wrong, in which case this case is over.

We are

Made it very clear that thatfs exactly what we needed

11

done.

12

as the only issue that was remaining from litigation was,

13

what's the price?

14

said.

15

Your Honor is going to buy into the defendant's argument

16

today, you have to completely ignore the prior order that you

17

made almost a year ago.

18

and over again Your Honor said Mr. Kuhlmann, (inaudible)

19

client can't find an expert, in which case this case is over

20

with.

21
22
23

That's exactly what this court's order

We still have to litigate what's the price.

So, if

And it's important to note that over

THE COURT:

And right now you say this case is over

MR. OLSON:

He doesn't have the expert.

with.

24

over with.

25

which entities were paid.

This case is

Now, we have gone ad nauseam over this issue of
Mr. Kuhlmann asserts that, Your

22

1

Honor, there is no fact before this court that suggests the

2

amount paid to Academy Equity Investors paid the debt of

3

Academy Acres LLC.

4

Bruce Hughes in support of the last motion for summary

5

judgment, of paragraph 27 said, "As trustee of the Cheryl

6

Marie Bluth Farr Trust, I paid $115,000 to Academy Equity

We have (inaudible).

The affidavit of

7 J Investors, LLC, asking for a partial payment upon the
negative value of the decedent's interest in the Academy at
9 1 Cedar Mountain and Academy Acres LLC."
10

They did not

controvert that statement of fact.
Under Rule 1,

Ill

it is established fact.

It is

12

established fact that money was paid for the debt to those

13

entities.

14

step of the way.

15

whose name was on the check as long as the debt is satisfied.

16

Otherwise, it seems to suggest what this court is going to

17

look at this transaction and determine whether it should be

18

voidable and say okay, Academy Investors, you better make

19

sure that those guys get paid.

20

money.

21

The entities aren't disputing whether they got paid or not

22

that money.

23

Again, it's just we have argued this issue every
And it's a non-issue.

Make sure they get paid.

They got paid.

It doesn't matter

You are the one that got the
That's the only issue here.

So, it's a non-issue.

Lastly Your Honor, and I think I have already gone

24

over it ad nauseam, the defendants would suggest that we are

25

done based upon the very same argument that they made back in

ll

February.

Your Honor said no, we are not done.

We have to

2

litigate the buy/sell agreements.

3

the price is.

4

find an expert to support your position, we are done.

5

where we are today.

6

to support their position.

7

by the deadline.

8

provided affidavits in support of summary judgment, not

9

controverted by them.

We have to determine what

And, Mr. Kuhlmann, unless you can go out and

We are done.

That's

They don't have an expert

They have not produced a report

The only calculations before this court

These are the figures.

Court has an

10

accounting.

11

that this is the accounting, did not hire their experts to

12

contradict that.

13

we are done.

14
15

They have uncontroverted affidavit testimony

It's over.

As the court stated last time,

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

I'll take it under

advisement and issue a written ruling.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASFIINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF'UTAH

CHAD FARR, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
Case No: 030500098
BRUCE HUGHES, et al.,
Judge James L. Shumate
Defendants.

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' and Defendants' competing motions for summary
judgment. A hearing was held on the motions on January 8, 2008, at which both sides were
represented by counsel. Having considered the arguments of counsel, the motions, memoranda,
and other materials on file, the Court rules as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend, held February 20, 2007, the
Court determined that the issues in this case had been narrowed, and stated that the issue
remaining for trial was the validity of Defendants' calculation of the debt, if any, owed by Ms.
Fair's estate to the business entities. If the calculations were incorrect, as proved by an
independent expert provided by Plaintiffs, Defendants might be required to repay to the Trust

some amount, but if the calculations were correct, this case would be "over with" (Transcript of
February 20, 2007 Hearing, p. 21,1. 14). Accordingly, on April 26, 2007, The Court entered a
scheduling order that required Plaintiffs to designate an expert witness who could evaluate the
correctness of Defendants' calculations by April 30, 2007 and to provide an expert report by June
15, 2007. On May 1,2007, Plaintiffs designated Daemon J, Basile, CPA, as their expert;
however, they did not provide an expert report by the June 15 deadline established by order of
the Court.

ANALYSIS

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(d) states, "If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order,... the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)." Under Rule 37(b)(2), "unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to
the failure as are just," and among other actions, the Court may "dismiss the action or proceeding
or any part thereof," id. at (C).
The Court does not find that the failure to adhere to the established deadlines was
substantially justified. Plaintiffs instead argue, somewhat bafflingly in light of this Court's
previous orders, that they are not required to provide an expert report. This position is untenable
given (1) the Court's clear directive at the February 20, 2007 hearing; (2) the Amended
Scheduling Order with deadlines extended for the veiy purpose of allowing Plaintiffs to obtain an
expert report. Having failed even now to produce evidence that the calculations are in fact
2

incorrect, Plaintiffs must suffer the consequence previously announced
It is therefore ORDERED:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' case is
dismissed.
2. Plaintiffs are directed to return the $121,000.00 which has been held in trust to
Defendants.
Dated this

V

day of February, 2008.

JUDGE^MES L. SHUM&CE
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
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